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PREFACE
Privacy is an amorphous concept.

It has not only

a legal meaning, the subject of this study, but also sociological and psychological meanings which are beyond our
purview here.

An individual "right" to privacy, or "right

to be let alone," as it is often characterized, is an even
more complex idea.

It suggests a fundamental obligation of

people to respect another's private thoughts and affairs.
But a general "right to be let alone" must be separated
from the more limited discussion which will follow of the
United States citizen's right to privacy from governmental
intrusion, as the Supreme Court has protected that right
within the constitutional framework.

The more general

"right to be let alone" also includes those undesired
intrusions into one's privacy by other citizens and the
press which are protected in some instances through tort
cause of action, as provided by state statutes and common
law.

Though an interesting and indeed complex area itself,

the private law right "to be let alone" is severed from
this study except as it necessarily must be dealt with
briefly in the first chapter, where its effect on the introduction of the privacy right into public law will be shown.
Although this study of privacy will be restricted
to the Supreme Court's protection of it against invasion
\

...
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\

by

government, it is still a survey and analysis of rather large
dimensions, for what the constitutional "right to privacy"
has come to connote includes a congeriesofrights concerning
beliefs, ideas, the home, the dignity of the individual,
solitude in one's intimacies, autonomy in personal decisionmaking, electronic eavesdropping into one's private conversations, and disclosure of personal information.

This study

will attempt through a traditional method of case analysis
to determine the development of the Court's position on individual privacy rights by examining not only its decisions,
but also the dicta and some dissenting opinions, which oftentimes formed the basis of a later decision, and critical
assessments made by Court observers.
Analysis will begin with the origins of the privacy
concept in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and will
continue with the cases dealing with privacy through the
mid-twentieth century.

With the enunciation of a general

"right to privacy" doctrine in Griswold v. Connecticut in
19651 , the Court faced, as it does with all vague new doctrines, a torrent of litigation complaining of intrusions
into all sorts of "privacy" areas.

What the Court has said

in cases since 1965 about privacy, its constitutional underpinnings, and the Griswold decision itself is the heart of
this study.
"Apart from a good deal of private and official handwringing"2 about the threats of government snooping,. the other
1

.

391 u.s. 479.
2Robert B. McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emanations
and Intimations," Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 259,
'iv

branches of the government have done little, if anything,
to protect the privacy of the citizenry.

Complaints which

reached the Supreme Court were dealt with, at first, in
light of the small amount of privacy doctrine available.
Then, as new techniques were developed by the Court for protecting civil liberties and as government intrusions into
private lives occurred more frequently, the Court progressively reinterpreted its privacy standards.
The central thesis of this study is that the Supreme
Court, after a half-century of incrementally developing
"zones" of privacy protection through the various guarantees in the Bill of Rights, has arrived at a distinct, independent "right of privacy" with the potentiality of protecting privacy in a broad range of situations.

The Court

has, at least since its Griswold decision in 1965, been
developing a substantive, due process right to privacy in
the areas of marriage, family, conception, and abortion.
Although the privacy right's perimeters have yet to be
determined, its new "substantive" nature lends itself to the
protection of a myriad of other liberties involving personal
conduct.

However, the Court has shown that the right to

privacy cannot be absolute, but must be weighed against the
subordinating interest of the state in invading individual
and group privacy.

In other words, the "right to privacy"

has become a basic part of the theory that government is an
institution of limited powers that must meet a heavy burden
of justification when it interferes with the freedom of its
citizens.
v

CHAPI1ER I
ORIGINS OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Concept of Privacy
1
~r k"in d' s searc h f or privacy
·
h as anc1en
·
t or1g1ns.
· ·
i•an

Indeed, zones of privacy can be found "marked off, hinted
at, or groped for" from the first pages of the Bible to
the writings of Socrates and Epictetus, Thomas More, Locke,
and Emerson. 2 Privacy has been spoken of as one of the most
"elementary needs of all humans"J and as "one of the truly
profound values for a civilized society. 114 It has also
been called a "fundamental tenet of the American value
structure,"5 and an underlying theme of the Bill of Rights. 6

C~rlyle Breckinridge, The Right to Privacy
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1970),
p. 2. See also the discussion of the origins of the privacy
claim in Alan F. Westin, Privacv and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), chap. lJ.
2Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring
1Adam

1966): 272.

3navid H. Flaherty, Privac in Colonial New En land
(Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1972,
·p. 242.
4Harry Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren
and Brandeis Wrong?" Law and Contemporary Problems Jl (Spring

1966)1 326.

.

5Robert B. McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy," in The lCJ'.-;7_ SUD!"_'?~~-Q_o_y_r_:LF~view, ed: Philip 3, ~·:u!'lJ.nd
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 196~), p. 210.
6see Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). .
1

2

Furthermore, it is said that "some of the central meanings
of democracy are embedded in protections of pri~acy.

117

As the interest in privacy developed, various attempts
were also made to define a "right" to privacy in sociological,
psychological, and philosophical, as well as leeal, terms.
"Autonomy," "secrecy," "solitude," "control over the communication of information about oneself, 118 and "the rightful claim
of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes
to share of himself with others"9 are a few of the definitions that have been advanced.

Since the late nineteenth

century, however, the term that has most often been used is
simply "the right to be let alone. 1110 The "right to be let
a1one" could be claimed against government when one acted
publicly as well as when one acted privately.

It was the

claim-that there is an area that has not been given over to
public control--a sphere that a man can carry with him into
his home, his bedroom, his church, club, or organization,
and in some respects, into the street.
it was part of the inner man.

Even when public,

It was part of his "property"

in the Lockean sense," the kind of property with respect to
which its owner has delegated no power to the state." 11
7Alan P. Bates, "Privacy--A Useful Concept?" Social
Forces 42 (May 1964): 429.
-8Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 7.
9Breckinridge, The Right to Privacy, p. 1 . .
10The phrase was first encountered in Thomas M. Cooley
A Treatise on th!L_Law of Toyts, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Callaghan '
and Co., lSSS), p. 29, c.ccorji!1,; to -,'iilli3.m L . .?rosser, "..::ri-vacy, n California Law Review 48 (August 1960): J84.
11 Ernest Van Den Haag, non Privacy," in Priva_gv: Yearbook of the American Societv for Political and ].,§.£9-_Lll:tilQ§.2.=_
phy, No. 13, eds: Roland Pennocl: and John W. Chapman (hew York:

3

It is difficult, and almost impossible, however, to
determine precisely what the scope of an all-encompassing
"right to be let alone" would be.
of over-definition,

by

There is either the danger

which privacy would include the entire

range of human freedom, or the danger of under-definition by
which the right to privacy would be limited to statutory
and common law protections and to those zones of privacy that
can be identified as explicitly within the Bill of Rights,
primarily in the First Amendment. 12 Although the definition,
much less the scope, of the right to privacy has yet to be
determined by the Court, privacy has, nonetheless, been involved in or referred to extensively in decisions of the Court
for many decades.

Aspects of privacy were protected when

adjunct to or part of other values or areas explicitly protected by specific provisions of the Constitution.

However,

it was not until 1965 with Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S.

479, that the Court recognized the substantive quality of
the privacy right and declared it constitutionally protectable
through the "penumbras" of a number of "emanations" from the
Bill of Rights. 1 3 Until that constitutional declaration

in Griswold, privacy had been, if not a legal right, then a
Atherton Press, 1971), p. 149. For further discussion of the
sociological aspects of the privacy right, see Edward Shils,
"Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 281.
12william M. Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Ia.w," Law and Contemnorary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 255.
To compare two very different determinations of the.scope of
privacy protection, see William o. Douglas, The Right of the
Peo1Jle (Garden City, N.':{,: Doubleda~r and Co., i95n), c'.~s.-:>. 2:
anci S'.rlvia Snowiss, '"l'!1e

Le:~ac 1/

of Justice ,:,lac}::" in ·i.':;:;

~'~7'2,

Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B. Kurland (Chicago:-Universitv
of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 219.
'
1 3see below, p. J4.

4
cultural norm which "served the purpose of providing a rallying
point for those concerned about the encroachments of mass so-.
ciety on the individual" which began to occur in the late
nineteenth century with the industrial and technological revolutions.14
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
Constitution, statutes, and common law had provided effective
protections for the privacy needs of the person, home, and
communications.

Lockean assumptions of individualism, pri-

vate property, and limited government which were ingrained
in early American political thought and the Constitution,
had helped protect privacy.

The First Amendment was con-

sidered to protect "private sentiment," "private judgment," 1 5
and_"freedom of communion," including the "liberty of silence,"
and to free associations from "the spy, the mouchard, the
dilator, the informer, and the sycophant" of police government. " 16
Privacy was traditionally afforded protection also
through the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. 1 7 The Third
Amendment's prohibition of the quartering of so·ldiers in one's
home in time of peace without the owner's consent reveals the
early Americans' determination to protect the private realm
l4Clark c. Havighurst, "Foreword," Law and Contempora;ry Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 251-52.
1 5Justice Joseph Story, Comme~taries on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., J vols. (New York: DaCapo
Press, 1933), J: 726-7, quoted in Alan F. Westin, "Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's," part
2: "Balancing the Conflicting Demands of Privacy, Disclosure,
and Surveillance, "_9_g]~?C-io. I.a·:i Re·riew (;I) (rfoverr."oer 19('.S): ::.23;.
16Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self Government
(Phila.: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1859), pp. 89-90, quoted--rn:Westin, ibid., pp. 1233-34.
17see appendix .

5
from government invasion.

The Fourth Amendment, however, is

the clearest expression of privacy protection since it recognizes the necessity for security in persons, houses, and possessions from unreasonable government search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment states the traditional British concept
of a man's home as his castle.

The Fifth Amendment's pro-

tection against compelled self-incrimination was another bulwark for privacy in early American life.
The Fifth Amendment was interpreted by the latenineteenth century to be linked so closely to the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures that the compelled production of evidentiary materials
was considered to be the same as compelled self-incrimination.

This virtual merger of constitutional guarantees was

pronounced in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), a
criminal case which involved the threatened forfeiture of a
shipment of plate glass because of the owner's refusal to
produce an invoice for inspection by government officials.
In Boyd the Court said that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments

run."almost into each other" and that the doctrines of those
amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life." 18
In an earlier case, Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727

(1878), the Supreme Court had broadly interpreted what "effects" were protected by the Fourth Amendment by holding
that the mails were to be protected from 'tlnwarranted govern-

18 116

u.s.

616, 630 (1886).

6

ment intrusions, 19 In dictum the Court said that "~1 he
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may.be, 1120
After the broad interpretations of the Fourth Amendment given in Ex Parte Jackson and Boyd, the Court in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), decided upon a means
for enforcing the amendment's guarantees.

It adopted the

exclusionary rule which prohibited the admission in federal
courts of illegally seized evidence.

The decision further

stressed the necessity of the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment in order to protect the sanctity of one's home and effects:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized
and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against
such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution,21
These criminal cases involving government search
and seizure have been cited since the earliest protection
of privacy was made available through such litigation,

Be-

fore the technologicaJ. revolution, physical searches and
seizures were "primitive" but primary t.echniques of government
intrusion into person, home, and effects. 22 The technological
1 9"Privacy after Griswold: Constitutional or Natural
Law Right?" Northwestern University Law Review 60 (JanuaryFebruary 1966): 813.
20
.
.
. 96 U.S. 727, 73J,
21 232 U.S. J9J, 393.
22 Burt Neuborne, "Privacy and Individual Freedom," in
Uncle Sam is Watching You: Highlights from the Hearings of the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Wash., D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971), p. lJ.

7
innovations of the late nineteenth century, which accom-

panied the industrial revolution, though making_ possible
much of the privacy Americans enjoy, also made possible
new means for invading privacy.

Following closely behind

the inventions of the telephone, microphone and recorder,
and instantaneous photography, were wiretapping, electronic
eavesdropping, and surreptitious photography.

Psychological

and sociological research developed methods of testing personality, detecting lies, and accumulating information by
numerous means.
With the wide range of techniques becoming available
for surveillance, information-gathering, and psychological
studies, the major threats to privacy became the political,
administrative and cultural institutions, including popular
journalists, private police and investigators, private business researchers, and psychological and sociological researchers.

The average American seemed to take the intrusions

as a matter of course and did not complain.

Glenn Negley,

writing about the value that Americans have traditionally
given to privacy, explains that it is "a historical commonplace that problems often await acknowledgment until circumstantial developments force them upon our attention.If America's failure to recognize privacy "as a factor pertinent
to moral and political speculation" has made the inevitable
confrontation "one of the most critical problems of contemporary political and legal analysis," Negley further says
that the rapid change in our technolog:r and social st:ructure "forces us to recognize that the privacy which •.• has

8

apparently been casually presumed as an ingredient of moral
action can no longer be presumed but must be specified. 112 3
In 1890, the increasingly intrusive press so enraged
two young Boston attorneys that they specified the privacy
to which they felt every citizen has a right.

In an article

in the Harvard Law Review espousing the view that man is entitled to "be let alone," Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis (later to be Justice Brandeis) wrote that "political,
social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its. eternal youth, grows to
meet the demands of society." 24 They insisted that the courts
had used the principle, but under other labels, for there
was no common law recognition of the right of privacy.

Even

though legal authorities have differed on the value of a
privacy tort, 25the Warren and Brandeis article appears to have
been influential in.deciding cases concerning privacy rights
2 3Glenn Negley, "Philosophical Views and the Value of

Privacy," Law and Contemporary Problems 31 (Spring 1966): 320.
24samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis "The Right
of Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (December 1890): 193. The
article developed from their outrage over newspaper accounts
of the personal affairs of Boston bluebloods, including Warren's
family.
25see Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Law,"
p. 257. See also William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
Review 48 (August 1960): 383, who subdivides privacy in tort
law into four categories·: (1) appropriation of another person's
name or likeness for personal advantage; (2) intrusion upon a
~erson's seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs;
(3) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about a
person; (4) publicity that places a person in a false light in
the public eye. See also Edward J. Blaustein, "Privacy, Tort
Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty
and Unconstitutional as Well?" Texas Lavi Review 46 (April 196q):
Gll, where the discussio~ ce~ters on the ··~ass publicatio~ to~t~
See also Harry Kalven, Jr., "Privacy in Tort Law," p. 326, who
said Warren and Brandeis gave birth to a "trivial" tort.

9
which.began appearing at the turn of the century.

Since the
"6
first legal recognitions of a right to privacy in tort law, 2

the privacy right has been granted status of varying degrees
throughout the states.

Some have recognized it in common

law while others have granted it statutory status.

Whatever the standing of the privacy claim in private law, 27
important though it be, it will not be further discussed in
this paper.

It has been important, however, for the develop-

ment of a constitutionally recognized concept of privacy.
It is doubtful whether privacy claims against the intrusions
of government would ever have entered the courtroom, if they
had not first been recognized and discussed in the private
law sector. 28
Fourth Amendment Privacv Protections
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the
term "right to privacy" or "right to be let alone" had been
introduced into legal circles.

About the same time, a pri-

vacy issue which has been of continuous focus throughout this

26 rn Schuvler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y. Supp, 787 (1891),
the court recognized a right to privacy in a question of whether
private citizens had a right to erect a statue of a locally
prominent woman over her family's objections. In Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902), the court
found that a right of privacy had been invaded when the plaintiff's photograph was used without her permission to sell
flour. In Pavesich v ~ Nev-1 E land Life Insurance Co., 122
Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905 , the court held that a victim of
an invasion of pri vac;y could recover· damages.
27rn.Ettore v. Philco Broadcasting Corp., 229 F 2d 481,
48.5 {1956), Judge Biggs said, "The state of the law is still
that of a haystack in a hurricane .... We read of the rLo;ht of
..,....-r~--:r.,c'r
J...1--V<.) I
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of equitable servitude, of unfair competition, and there are
even suggestions of unjust enrichment." Quoted in Breckinridge,
The Right to Privacy, p. 127.
28 For further discussion of the private law of privacy,
see Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American Law."

10
century, arose in a criminal case before the Supreme Court.

The case was Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
which came before the Court as a direct result of the Eighteenth Amendment ratified in 1919 and the Volstead Act which
Congress had passed to enforce it.

The petitioner Olmstead,

a rum runner, was convicted during Prohibition on evidence
of conversations that federal agents had heard in the five
months they tapped his phone.

Chief Justice William Howard

Taft, writing the opinion of the Court for a majority of
five, said that the liberal construction of the Fourth Amendment could not "justify enlargement of the language employed
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons,
~apers,

and effects, or so to apply the words search and sei-

zure as to forbid hearing and sight. 1129 The Court refused to
continue the liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
begun by Boyd and Weeks.

Clinging to the concept of tangible,

"propertied" privacy, the Court held that wiretapping was not
a physical trespass in the technical sense and therefore was
not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Of the four dissenters, Justice Louis D. Brandeis
contributed immeasurably to the constitutional doctrine of
privacy.

His words have been quoted in federal and state court

opinions ever since he penned them.

If the Brandeis view had

prevailed, a broad right of privacy would have been firmly
established in the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Brandeis argued

that the Fourth Amendment was traditionally a guarantee of
a broad right of. privacy and that the Framers" •.. conferred,

as against the Government, the right to be let alone ...... 3°
2 9277

u.s. ·4J8, 465.

JOibid., 478,

11

Furthermore, he said that new ways would be found to abuse
individual rights, and so guarantees had to be -continually
extended to protect these rights:

But "time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes." Subtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government,
by means far more effective than stretching upon
the rack to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.31
After the retreat of the privacy doctrine in Olmstead, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' privacy implications
were virtually abandoned by the Court for several decades.3 2
Olmstead remained the basis for legal wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping even after Congress inserted an ambiguous provision, Section 605, into the Federal Communications Act of 1934.

That section was designed to outlaw

wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by federal officers,
·but when the question came before the Court in Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the Court held that
electronic eavesdropping by the means used here--a detectaphone placed against the petitioners' wall--was neither a
"communication" nor an "interception" within the meaning of
the Federal Communications Act.

Furthermore, since there had

been no "interception" of a telephone conversation before
its destined place, but only an "overhearing" of the message,

there had been no trespass, therefore, under the Olmstead rationale
Through the fifties and early sixties the Court generally
Jlibid .• 473.
32Angela R. Holder, "01.d Wine in New Bottles? The Right
of Privacy and Future School Prayer Cases," Journal of Church
and State 12 (Spring 1970): 239.
J.3 31 6 u.s. 129, lJJ.

12

f'ollowed the Olmstead-Goldman "trespass" doctrine and upheld
the use of electronic devices to monitor conversations. In
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), the Court invoked the "physical trespass" distinction and held that the
petitioner had freely engaged in conversation with a federal
agent and overruled his objection that his Fourth Amendment
right of privacy had been invaded by the recording of his
conversation and admission of it as evidence against him.

In Lonez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), the Court
upheld the use of a secret recording device by an Internal
Revenue Service agent to obtain proof that he had been off'ered a bribe by a delinquent taxpayer.

However, Justice

William J, Brennan's dissent, in which Justice William

o.

Douglas and Arthur J. Goldberg joined, gave one reason to
believe that the Court might be "on the brink of a ruling
defining a comprehensive, positive right of privacy from unreasonable surveillance:"3 4
Olmstead's illiberal interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment as limited to the tangible fruits of actual trespass was a departure from the Court's previous decisions, notably Bovd, and a misreading of
the history and purpose of the Amendment. Such a
limitation cannot be squared with a meaningful right
to inviolate personal liberty ..•• Specifically, the
Court in the years since Olmstead has severed both
supports for that decision's interpretation of the
Fourth.Amendment. We have held that the fruits of
electronic surveillance, though intangible, nevertheless are within the reach of the Amendment.35
34westin, "Science, Privacy, and Freedom," part 2:
"Balancing,"·p. 1248. Westin says that an ideal ruling would
be one holding Olmstead no longer relevant, recognizing a
constitutional richt of Dri V3.C'.' i:r_ the ?irst .\seY:d!:lent q;;.:l
"libert~:" clauses a: -chG ~7 i::-:::--. and ::.·ourteentrc Ar.1endr:-.effi:S, 21d
measuring government intrusions into privacy by the require· ments of due process. Ibid ..
35373 u.s. 427, 459-60 (1963).
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Further in his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested
a new basis for the privacy right--the First Amendment:
But freedom of speech is undermined where people
fear to speak unconstrainedly in what they suppose
to be the privacy of home and office ... , The right
to privacy is the obverse of freedom of speech in
another sense. The Court has lately recognized
that the First Amendment freedoms may include the
right, under certain circumstances to anonymity ..•.
The passive and the quiet, equally with the active
and the aggressive, are entitled to protection when
engaged in the precious activity of expressing
ideas or beliefs. Electronic surveillance destroys
all 8-nonirmi ty and all privacy; it makes government
privy to everything that goes on.36
What Justice Brennan was referring to when he· said
that the Court since Olmstead "has severed both supports
fo~

that decision's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment"

were the two decisions in 1961 and 1963 that had somewhat
weakened the Olmstead rationale.

In Silverman v.· United

States, J65 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court held that the use of
a spike microphone constituted a trespass against which the
Fourth Amendment's guarantees did apply.

Then, in Wong Sun

v. United States, 361 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court held that
obtaining incriminating conversations by recording devices
without a warrant was an illegal search and seizure.
In protecting privacy in the traditional areas of
search and seizure, that is, areas other than electronic surveillance, the Court was slow to evolve stringent constitutional standards.

The rule excluding evidence illegally seized

which was deve.loped in Weeks in 1914 as effective against the
federal government was not applied against the states until
1961 in

I.~aDP v.

Ohio, Jr)? U.S.

Colorado, 338 U.S.

J 6..;b.d.
.

.L ].

~·

25

~1949),

470-71.

1~4J.

~Ianp

overturned :,/olf v.

which had held that although

"security of

on~'s
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privacy against arbitrary intrusion by

the police" was enforceable against the states through the
due process clause, "the ways of enforcing such a basic right
raise questions of a different order ... 3 7 Mapp, in overturning
Wolf, held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures ·in violation of the Constitution, is by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."3 8
In the years between Wolf and ffapp, the Court encountered alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment's "unreasonableness" provision.

In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),

police officers had f orceably pumped the stomach of a prisoner
and used the evidence to convict him of drug trafficking.

Jus-

tice Felix Frankfurter, who had written the Wolf opinion, also
wrote this opinion.

But without a mention of Wolf, he said

that such coerced confessions were constitutionally excluded
from state trials through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
"not only because of their unreliability ,,,"but because, even

.if independently verifiable, they "offend the community's
sense of fair play and decency."39 Furthermore, Frankfurter
said the stomach pump proceedings "do more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,

This is

conduct that shocks the conscience. 1140 ·Justices Hugo Black and
William Douglas concurred in the decision, but insisted that
the appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been clearly violated.

Justice Douglas said that

37 :338 U. S·. 25, 27-2° ( 191}9).
38367 U.S. 64J, 655 (1961).
39342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
40

Ibid., 172.

.
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"words taken from {!.n accused's] lips, capsules taken from
his stomach, blood taken from his veins are all inadmissible
0

0

I

without his consent .•• because of the command of the

Fifth Amendment. 1141
In another case involving Fourth Amendment rights
before the

Map~

decision, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128

(1954), the Court faced the problem of reconciling the divergent implications of Wolf and Rochin.

In Irvine, police il-

legally entered the Irvines' house, installed electronic surveillance equipment, and from a nearby garage, recorded conversations,

The police again illegally entered and ransacked

the house and arrested the suspect.

Nevertheless, the Court

relied on Wolf to include evidence obtained.

The Court said

that Rochin had involved elements lacking in Irvine: an illegal search of the defendant's person and coercion. 42
The security of the home, person, and effects was set
on a somewhat stronger base by the holding in Mapp.

However,

in other claims of Fourth Amendment privacy rights, the Court
gave the government more latitude to determine what was a constitutional search and seizure.

The Court relaxed the warrant

restrictions on federal searches and seizures when "incident

' '' p 1ain
' view.
.
"44 Al so, in
.
t o arres t, 4 3 an d when evi'd ence was in
1

an administrative inspection case, Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.

360 (1959), the Court, despite the invasion of privacy alleged,
upheld the health department's warrantless inspection of the

41 Ibid., 179.
42 347 u.s·. 12R, 133 (195~).
4 3 See U.S. v. Rabinowitz, JJ9 U.S. 56 (1950) and
Stoner v. California, J76 u.s. 43J (1964).
44See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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appellant's home for rodents because the inspector had substantial evidence from a search of the grounds.

The majority

opinion by Justice Frankfurter recognized a right to privacy
but seemed to say that it could only be invoked against
searches for criminal evidence, and not solely to protect
one's privacy.

Justice Douglas, with whom Chief Justice Earl

Warren and Justices Black and Brennan joined, dissented:
The Court said in Wolf ... that "the security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police--which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment--is basic to a free society." Now that resounding phrase is watered dovm to embrace only
certain invasions of one's privacy.45
In other cases involving the claim of inviolability
of the body, as in Rochin, the Court generally balanced the
privacy claim against the state's interests in health, public safety, and morality.

In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.

432 (1957), where the results of a blood-alcohol test administered on an unconscious man were admitted in evidence for a
manslaughter conviction, the Court upheld the admission of
the evidence.

It said that "as against the right of an indi-

vidual that his person be held inviolable .•. must be set
the interests of society .... 046 Justice Black joined with
Justice Douglas in the following dissent:
But the sanctity of the person is equally violated
and his body assaulted where the prisoner is incapable of offering resistance .... Nor would I
draw a line between involuntary extraction of words
from his lips, the involuntary extraction of the
contents of his stomach, and the involuntary extraction of fluids of his body when the evidence
obtained is used to convict him ••.. The indignity
to the illdividual is the same in one case as in the
othar ..• 7
.
4 5359 u.s. 360, 375 (;959).
46 352 u.s. 432, 439 (1957).
4 7Ibid;, 4J2, 443-44.
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By the beginning of the early sixties, it was unclear whether the Court had determined "inviolability of
the body" to be a privacy right protectable through the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Rochin had declared that

forced stomach pumping was "conduct that shocks the conscience"
whereas Breithaupt permitted a blood-alcohol test without
consent.

Two cases reaching the Supreme Court in 1964 were

inconclusive with respect to fashioning a right to privacy,
but were significant indications of increasing litigation
in this constitutional area.

In Schlagenpauf v. Holder, 379

U.S. 104 (1964), the petitioner alleged an unconstitutional
invasion of the privacy of his body since good cause was not
shown for the lower court's requiring multiple medical examinations to be performed on his person.

The Court did not

rule on the privacy question, but did vacate the judgment
Of the lower court.

However, Justice Douglas, dissenting

in part, would deny at any time a compulsory medical exam
upon the defendant in a damage suit.

He said that .. [rU either

the Court nor Congress .•• has determined that any person
whose physical or mental condition is brought into question
during some lawsuit must surrender his right to keep his person inviolate. 1148
In a second case in 1964, the Court denied certiorari.
In York v. Story, .324 F. 2d 450 (9th cir. 196J), cert. denied

376 U.S. 939 (1964), a federal court had held for the first
time that a right of privacy through the "liberty" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated by the state.

48 379

-u.s. 10~.

126.
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York, a young woman brought a damage suit claiming an abridg-

ment of her civil rights when, after she had reported an
assault on her person, police forced her to undress before
them for photographs and then passed the photographs around
the station.

The lower court spoke of the privacy which was

invaded in the following terms:
We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of
privacy than the naked body ..•. A sea~ch of one's
home has been established to be an invasion of
one's privacy against intrusion by the police,
which, if "unreasonable," is arbitrary and therefore banned under the Fourth Amendment. We do not
see how it can be argued that the searching of
one's home deprives him of privacy, but the photographing of one's nude body, and the distr~bution
of such photographs to strangers does not,49
A1though finding that the photographing of the plaintiff's
body had been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
lower court held that Fourth Amendment grounds could not
dispose of the whole case, since the subsequent acts of
po1ice in

distr~buting

prints of the photographs could not

be characterized as unreasonable searches.

Therefore, the

court concluded that all the unlawful acts of the police
"constituted an arbitrary intrusion upon the security of
her privacy, as guaranteed to her by the Due Process Clause
of' the Fourteenth AmendJnent, .. 50
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were the starting
point for the development of a right of privacy by the Court.
However, the gains made by Silverman and Wong Sun in the area
of electronic surveillance and by Mapp, Rochin, and York in
areas of searches and seizures were meager when weighed against
the

gene~al

permissiveness of the Court in electronic surveil-

49324 F. 2d 450, 455 (9th
50ibid,, 456.

cir. 196J),
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lance, as evidenced by On Lee and Lopez; in the area of police
searches and seizures, as evidenced by Irvine and Breithaupt;
and in the area of administrative searches, as evidenced by
Frank.
First Amendment Privacy Protections
Privacy was more effectively protected in the fifties and early sixties by recognition of those privacy interests implicit in the specific guarantees of the First
Amendment,

After the end of World War II, new specialists

in intrusions were created with new arguments for their
indispensability: the war itself, the Cold War, and national
security.5 1 Their creation, however, also created the necessity for protecting the individual's political privacy riehts
!

under the First Amendment.

The Office of Strategic Ser-

vices, Military Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investivation, and Central Intelligence Agency carried on far-flung
activities in surveillance and invasion of civilian privacy in order to acquire information and monitor the actions
of Americans.5 2 The House Un-American Activities Committee
and the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security conducted
extensive investigations into the lives of citizens considered
"security risks" and forced the administrative branch of the
federal government, as well as state governments and private
51 Justice Brandeis once wrote that we should "be
most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's
purposes are beneficient .••• " Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438,
479 ( 1928).
.
2
5 see Raiph ::ader, "In'·:.sion of t:i9 Hor.ie," in 1":-~"!..::;
Sam Is Watching You, p. 2Jl, .for a review of the extension
of the surveillance technologyinto the private sector.
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employers, to institute "security checks" on employees,
bringing into use personality testing and lie detecting.
Though the i'ntensity of anxiety about "national
security" declined in the sixties, the investigative,
prying, and snooping routines of the government remained,53
They remained for numerous reasons, but probably most of all
because of the self-perpetuating way in which bureaucracy
operates.

Once a program has been started, the political

and occupational interests keep it going.

There is still a

dangerous overtone to the surveillance of today.

Govern-

ment agencies gather and assemble facts about millions of
ordinary Americans into computers and make this information
available to private organizations and businesses under lessthan-adequate safeguards.

Americans hear that they "are

rapidly entering the age of no privacy .• ,"and the next
step in sophisticated snooping may be electronic snooping
inside the brain "so that even our thoughts may be made
available to anyone with curiosity and a sensitive machine. 5 4
11

In popular novels written since the 1949 publication of George
Orwell's 1..2.§!!, the citizen is urged to become more fearful
53rt is impossible in a paper of limited scope such
as this one to go into the electronic surveillance, data accumulation, and other various means by which the government,
uninvited, invades citizen's lives. See Nader, "Invasion of
the Home," p. 231; Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Priv)cy
. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1971 ;
"A Secret Dossier on Every American?" U.S. News and World Report __ 27 August 1973, p. 54; and Alan F. Westin and Michael
A. Baker, eds., Databanks in a Free Societv: Comnuters, Recordkeeping, and Privacy, Report-Ofthe Project on Computer Science
and En ineerin Board National Academ of Science (New York:
Quadrangle 3ooks, 1972 .
Sl'r~orris L. Ernst, The Great Reversals: Tales of the
Supreme Court (New York: Weybright and Talley, 197J), p. 181.
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of the threats that government intrusions pose for society.55
In a not-so-humorous vein a law professor has predicted that
bY: the year 2000, "someone will make a fortune merely by providing, on a monthly, weekly, daily, or even hourly basis,
a room of one's own."56
Thus it is apparent that First Amendment rights and
closely related rights of privacy in ideas and actions "cannot survive ..• unless the courts and public mores install a
curtain of law and practice to replace the walls and doors
that have been swept away by the new instruments of surveillance. 1157 However, it has only been in recent years that the
outrage of congressional committees and the press over the
enormities of government intrusion has activated a new concern for the protection of privacy.

In other words, what

Americans have considered to be as democratic as the secret
ballot--the privacy of individual political ideas--has not
always been protected by government.

This freedom, as well

as other facets of individual behavior--one's beliefs, emotions, associations, reputation, and personal conduct-was ·not defined by the Court until the mid-twentieth century.

In the fifties the Court recognized the threat posed
by government interrogation and prying into one's private
ideas and associations and, in a series of cases, actively
protected privacy rights through the First Amendment.

In

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the right of associational

· 55see Myron Brenton, The Privacv Invaders (New York:
Coward-T.1cCann, 1964) and Vance Packard, ?he r.:2.Y:ed Societ·r ( ::e·.·1
'.T
. . .,,... ay co. , _nc.
T
/Ir.) •
_or k : D . LC1
, ir:)'Yr6
.5 Henry Kalven, "The Problems of Privacy in the Year
2000," Daedalus 96 (Summer 196?): 832, quoted in McKay, "SelfIncrimination and the New Privacy," p. 210 .
.57westin, Privacy and Freedom, p. 398.

privacy was enunciated,
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In Watkins v. United States, J54 U.S.

178 (1957), the· right of political privacy was identified,
The right to anonymity in public expression was most ably presented in Tallev v, California, J62 U,S, 60 (1960),
In NAACP individual privacy interests were being invaded by Alabama's efforts to require the National Association for the AdvancP.ment of Colored People (NAACP) to turn
over its membership and officer lists,

The Court found a

"vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy
in one's associations 11 58 and referred to that privacy as one
of the fundamental freedoms protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In a subsequent case filed

against the NAACP, La. ex rel, Gremillion v, NAACP, 366 U.S.

293 (1961), the Court held two state statutes unconstitutional
which, as appi'ied to the NAACP, required the filing of the
names and addresses of officers and members and affidavits
testifying that· none of the officers of any group with which
the NAACP was affiliated was subversive.
In cases such as these the Court defended the privacy
o:f association where the association was not subversive and

not engaged in unlawful activities.

This distinction was

made by the Court in NAACP when it referred to its decision
in N, Y, ex rel. Brvant v, Zimmerman, 278 U.s. 63 ( 1928), which
had upheld the state's requirement that the Ku Klux Klan file

58357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958),

"Freedom to engage in association," though not a specifically enumerated right in the
Bill of Rights, was nonetheless held by the Court in· NAACP _~r,
Alabama, 357 J,s,· 449, l+.]O, to '.Je "an insepar<:?..ble 3.spect oi'the 'liberty• assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. 0
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the names of its members.

That decision was based on the

unlawful nature of Klan activities,

The distinction was

also made with reference to the case of Uphaus v. Wvman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959), where the state's interest in obtaining the
names of the guests at the World Fellowship camp, known to
have Communist connections, outweighed the constitutional
interests asserted by the appellant as to his associational
privacy.

Through such cases the Court made clear that pri-

vacy cannot be an unlimited right of associations "that
seek undesirable social objectives whose methods of operation run afoul of reasonably applied conspiracy doctrines,"59
The Court made certain also that the government clearly
ascertained the unlawful or conspiratorial nature of associations.

Thus, in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating

Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963), the Court reversed the contempt conviction of the president of the Miami branch of the
NAACP.

The decision rested on the lack of sufficient evi-

dence by the legislature to prove a substantial connection
between the Miami NAACP and Communist activities.
Political privacy was also identified as an important
adjunct to the freedoms of the First Amendment in Watkins.
In that case, however, the right was not granted absolute
status, but the Court said it would be protected in Congressional committee hearings if "pertinency" was not satisfied. 60
59Beaney, "The Rieht to Privacy and Americal'l. Law,"
p. 261. See also David Fellman, The Constitutional Right of
Association (Chicago: University of Chica~o Press, 1963).
\)Oin '.!atidns, thie Co~rt reversed the con·-riction of 2.
labor union official who, before the House Un-American Activities Committee, refused to answer questions about persons no
longer in the Communist Party.
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Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, said: "There
is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of
the Congress. 1161
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 2J4 (1957),
the state equivalent of Watkins, the refusal of a guest lecturer at a state university to answer questions asked of him
by a state official investigating alleged subversive activities had led to a conviction for contempt.

Chief Justice

Warren, who wrote the Court's opinion overturning the conviction, said, "We do not now conceive of any circumstance
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights
in these fields. 1162 The broadest statement of political privacy yet written by members of the Court, however, was Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion:
••• the inviolability of privacy belonging to a
citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming
an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it can't be constitutionally encroached
upon on the basis of so meager a countervailing
interest of the state.6J
Furthermore, he said that it was the Court's duty to balance
"the right of a citizen to political privacy as protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment and the right of the state to selfprotection. 1164
In protecting the right to anonymity in public expression in Talley, the Court found the right closely related to the right of associational privacy
the NAACP cases.

61

enuncia~ed

in

In Talley, a California ordinance requiring

.
J54 U.S. 173, 187 (1957).
62 354 U.S. 2J4, 251 (1957).
63
.
Ibid., 265.
64 rbid ..

25
handbills to carry the names and addresses of sponsors
was invalidated,

The Court noted the important role that

anonymous pamphlets and circulars had played in mankind's
progress and held that the California ordinance "would
tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and
thereby freedom of expression." 6 5
These three First Amendment rights of privacy were
substantially well established by the sixties, but they
were, for the most part, political rights, and were still
to be weighed against the "countervailing interest of the
state."

An area of contended First Amendment privacy that

the Supreme Court did not protect during that decade was
the so-called right of "solitude" or the right not to speak
or be spoken to, such as the right of a traveler on public
transportation to be free from imposed radio music and news.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952),
the Court reviewed a court of appeals decision that held
that a constitutional right of privacy had been violated by
the Washington, D.C., public utilities commission's imposition of radio news and music on the complainant.

The Court

balanced the privacy claim against the interests of the
general convenience of passengers and found the latter interest more substantial.

Moreover, the Court held that the

·commission had not violated any constitutional right of
riders under the First Amendment or under the "liberty"
concept of the Fifth Amendment.
The fifties and early sixties did not see the blossoming of a· right to privacy since the Olmstead rationale
65362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960),
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remained (although some weakening of it occurred), the inviolability of the body was still not secured, administrative
searches were upheld; and police were given even greater
latitude in search and seizure procedures.

However, the

"spirit engendered" 66 by the Court's activism in protecting
First Amendment privacy rights during those years perhaps
gave impetus to the.judicial formulation in 1965 of a
general right of privacy.

66 "Privacy after Griswold: Constitutional or Natural
Law Right?u p. 819.

CHAPTER II
A UNITARY RIGHT OF PRIVACY ENUNCIATED
Until Griswold v. Connecticut, 1 recognition by the
Court of a right to privacy was either adjunct to a criminal action, especially when it could fit neatly into the
search and seizure category, or it was expressed in terms
of First Amendment guarantees of freedom of expression.
Proponents of an independent doctrine of privacy foresaw
the development of a broader interpretation within the con1

cept of "liberty" through the due process clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, especially after a lower federal
court had successfully used such an interpretation in the
York case. 2 The chief proponent of this view was Justice
William

o.

Douglas, one of the Court's strongest libertarians

and most steadfast supporter of a right to privacy.
Justice Douglas came on the Court in 1939.
in Goldman, he adhered to the

Olmst~_ad

In 1942

"trespass" doctrine,

but by 1952, in On Lee v. U.S., he had had a change of heart,
dissenting in·favor of the protection of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.

As discussed in Chapter I, Justice Douglas

urged recognition of a right of privacy through the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment in Rochin and in Irvine,

1381

u.s. 479

(1965),

2see a b ove, pp. 19 - 20 .
27
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and to some extent in Schlagenhauf.

He also areued that the

Wolf decision afforded protection of a Fourth Amendment right
of privacy.3 In his 1958 book, The Right of the People, avowing
his devotion to civil liberties, Douglas used words very similar to those he would use in the majority opinion in Griswoldz
There is, indeed a congeries of ... rights that
may conveniently be called the right to be let
alone. They concern the rieht to privacy--sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in the Constitution. This right of privacy protects freedom
or religion and freedom of conscience .•• the privacy of the home and the dignity of the individual. 4
Justice Douglas expressed a belief that natural
rights, explicit or implicit in the Constitution, were
broadly based in morality and religionz "The penumbra of the
Bill of Rights reflects human rights which, though not explicit, are implied from the very nature of man as a child of
God."5 Although he stated that "every Fourth Amendment contest involves to a degree an issue of privacy," 6 he did not

choose that Amendment as his basis for the right to privacy,
but concluded that due process includes those guarantees "irnplici t in the concept of ordered liberty" and outlaws practices "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."7 This concern for those guarantees "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" led him to write in his dissent in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak 8 that alone with privacy implications in
Jsee Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 375 (1959).
4 William o. Douglas, The Right of the Peonle (Garden City, N.Y.i Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1958), p. 87.
5rbid., p. 89.
6 rbid., p. 149.
7Palko v, Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 323, 325 (1937).
8 343 u.s. 451 (1952).
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the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, there was also a
guarantee of privacy within the "liberty" of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Although Justice Douglas had a strong ally in Justice Hugo Black in defending civil liberties, including a
broad interpretation of privacy through the First Amendment
and the

self-incrim~nation

clause of the Fifth Amendment, he

and Black separated with regard to the Fourth Amendment's
right of privacy and to guarantees of privacy and other
areas of "the right to be let alone" 9 through substantive
due process.

Although they were both libertarians, it was

Douglas' view that the Constitution was written to, in John
Marshall's famous words, "be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs," whereas Black opposed any such view, · acknowledging his utter distaste for "judicial legislating."
Black believed judges should seek the Framers' intent by
examining the "literal meaning" of the words in the Constitution.10 It was this essential difference of opinion about the
judicial function that was to emerge between these two justices in the Griswold decision.
11
.
In Poe v. Ullman, substantially the same case as
Griswold, but which the Court did not decide for lack of justiciabili ty, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, again
suggested that the substantive guarantee of "liberty" embodied
9Douglas included within this right such freedoms as
religion, travel, and silence, See Douglas, The Right of the
People,. chap. 2.
10see Tiri.sley E. ··r..:-":Jrou.csh, "Justices ~lc:.ck and 1Jo1_, -1-=-~::-:
The Judicial ?unction c.ir!d -:he .Scope of Constitutional Liberties,"
Duke Law Journal (June 197J): 451.
11 367 u.s. 497 (1961).
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a right to privacy:
Though I believe that "due process" as used in the
Fourteenth A~endment includes all of the first
eight amendments, I do not think it is restricted
and confined to them ...• "Liberty" is a conception
that sometirr.es gains content from the emanations
of other specific guarantees ... or from experience with the requirements of a free society.12
Thus, when Griswold came before the Court in 1965, involving
the same area of

un~numerated

"liberty," it seemed the opinion

was already prepared in Douglas' mind.

The only remaining

task was to win a majority of the Court's support.
Background of the Litigation
It had not been an easy road that finally led opponents of Connecticut's tough anti-birth control laws to a
satisfactory Supreme Court decision, indeed to positive action
in any form.

Between 1917 and 1963, Planned Parenthood and

other birth control groups had seen no less than twenty-nine
bills for modification or repeal of the contraceptive laws
die in the state legislature.

Connecticut's contraceptive

laws were known to be the strictest among the state versions
of the federal Comstock Act of 1873. 1 3 The Connecticut statute
'

prohibiting use of contraceptive devices was enacted in 1879
and, after revisions in 1888 and 1958 which added an accessory
statute, the statutes at issue were the following:
12Ibid., pp. 515-17.
1 3Peter Smith, "The History and Failure of the Legal
Battle Over 3irth Control," Cornell Law Quarterly 49 (Winter
1964): 275. The federal Comstock Act stood until 1932 when the
courts ruled it virtually nugatory. The Connecticut statute
was·enacted under pressure from the Protestant community, as
part of 2. ~e-:!eral r!0:!'.'2.l C.·2c·::::-.c·· '3.Ct. "'"n J_'J~~ -t":,e ::-7~at1x;;:c ·:'"'..S
removed from the act and made a single statute with an accessory clause to include those who assisted people in obtaining
contraceptives. Ibid.-~

31
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article
or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or
imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than
one year or be both fined and imprisonect.14
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires or co:nmands aDother to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
principal offender.15
Since the legislative tactic seemed futile, in
1935 the Birth Control League of Connecticut began the legal
struggle by opening a birth control clinic which resulted
1
in State v. Nelson ~nd Tileston v. Ullman! 7 in both of which
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the constitutionality of the statutes, holding them to be reasonable
exercises of the state's police powers.

The prosecution in

both cases concerned the accessory statute.

The Supreme

Court denied appeal in Tileston on grounds that the plaintiff,
. ht s. 18
.
t o asser t h'is pa t'ien t s ' rig
a d oc t or, h a d no s t an d ing

A massive legal assault took place between May 19.58
and I/!ay 19.59, in which nine persons brought action for declar-

atory judgment as to the constitutionality of the statutes.
The case that reached the Court, Poe v. Ullman, 1 9 involved
litigants under the fictitious names of Poe, Doe, and Hoe,
who sought to establish their right to receive contraceptive
information from their physician, Dr. Buxton, also a litigant. 20

14section 53-32, General Statutes of Connecticut ( 1958 rev).
1

5section 54-196, ibid ..
16 126 Conn. 412, 11 A. 2d 8.56 ( 1940).
1 7129 Conn. 84, 26 A. 2d 582 (1942).
18 31() u.s. 1}4 (191J.3), Q2JY,.?~'l.L..9i§:-:-l;_~~ed.
10 ,
.
I
'Jo? U.S. 497

(

,-

)

.

.

19ol , anneal d1s81ssed.

2 °For information about the. other six persons who had
brought action, see Smith, "Legal Battle over Birth Control,"
p. 219.
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They contended that the statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives deprived them of life and liberty without due
process of law. 21 However, in the opinion of the Court,
written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the history of general
non-enforcement of the birth control statute and the remote
likelihood of arrests under it, demonstrated that the case
neither possessed the immediacy required nor was a true controversy.

Hence, the Court should not adjudicate any constitu-

tional question involved.

Joining Justice Frankfurter in the

opinion were Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Tom C.
Clark, Charles E. Whittaker, and William J. Brennan.

Of course,

as mentioned earlier, Justice Douglas dissented, enunciating
a marital privacy right which the Court would later accept:
The regulation as applied in this case touches
the relationship between man and wife: It reaches
into the intimacies of the marriaee relationship ...
when the State makes "use" a crime and applies the
criminal sanction to man and wife, the State has
entered the innermost sanction of the home. If it
can make this law, it can enforce it. And proof
of its violation necessarily involves an inquiry
into the relations between man and wife. That is an
invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free
society. . . . This notion of privacy is not dravm from
the blue. It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.22
Justice John

rn:.

Harlan, in dissent, believed that the

statute was "an intolerable and

unjust~fiable

invasion of pri-

vacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's. life "23 and found it unconstitutional on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds:
.••• the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited bv
22 367 u.s. 497, 519-21.
2 3Ibid., 539.
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the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution ...• It is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints ... and
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgment.24
The Facts of Griswold
In reaction to the Court's denial of appeal in Poe,
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, in open defiance of the law, made known that it would proceed to open
birth control clinics. 25 With the -Opening of a clinic at
New Haven, Estelle T. Griswold, Executive Director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Dr. Charles
L, Buxton, physician, professor at Yale Medical School,
and director of the New Haven Center, were arrested under
the accessory statute.

Litigation was initiated as State

v. Griswold, State v. Buxton.

After the statute was again

upheld by the Connecticut Supreme Court, Griswold v. Connecticut came to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Griswold and 3ux-

ton appealed to the Court on Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
asserting that the offense with which they were charged-_counseling and supplying contraceptives to married persons-should not be made a crime by the state.

The Court, however,

24 rbid., 541. Justice Stewart joined the dissents of

Justices Douglas and Harlan. Justice Black dissented by
saying that he believed the constitutional issue should be decided.
25The League issued this statement upon the.Poe decision: "We welcome the recogr.ition by the Court that the law has
in fact become a nulli t~r." L· ··. ":9~8.~9- ':'~i b;;;:e 21 Ju;:2 J. I")-< J_,
quoted in Sraith, "I..e.::;al .=att]_e v_;c;: ~)i:::-~:1 Cont;:ol," p. 2.5.

34
instead of finding standing of appellants under the accessory statute, found that they had "standing to .raise the con-.
stitutional rights of the married people with whom they had
a professional relationship," 26distinguishing the facts of
standing and justiciability. of Tileston. 2 7
The Court held that the Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy "lying within the zone of privacy created by ·
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 28 The division of the Court at 7-2 would give one the impression, at
first glance, of virtual unanimity in the new "penumbral
right to privacy" theory.

However, only Justice Tom Clark

seemingly concurred fully in Justice Douglas' opinion, since
he wrote no opinion.

Justices John Harlan, Byron White, and

Arthur Goldberg wrote distinctly separate opinions, with
.Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan joining
in Justice Goldberg's.

The dissents also were not casual,

for Justices Hugo Black and Potter Stewart each wrote lengthy
dissents, each joining in the other's.
The Opinion of the Court
Given Justice Douglas' posture on the right to privacy as.inherent in the concept of "liberty," especially in
his Poe.dissent four years earlier, one would have expected
him to place the Griswold decision directly on the due process clause.of the Fourteenth Amendment.
26 391
2 7The
in order to be
contraceptives
28 381

Instead, he enun-

u~s. 479, 4q1.
Court was obviously using the standing issue
able to consider the question of "use" of
and the broader right to marital privacy.
U.S. 479, 4S5.
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ciated an implicit "right to privacy" based on a "penumbral"
notion of constitutional rights.

He had indeed spoken of

"emanations of other specific euarantees" 29 prior to Griswold,
but it had been tied to the concept of "liberty" within the
due process clause.

Now he· introduced a vague and uncer-

tain theory which proposed that "emanating" from the various
guarantees of the Bill of Rights were various "zones of privacy," each of which ·would be given constitutional status.
He defended this penumbral theory by pointine to tirr.es when
the Court had defended other unwritten "penumbral" rights:
The associ~tionof people is not mentioned in the
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. The right
to educate a child in a school of the parents'
choice--whether public or private or parochial-is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study
any particular subject or any foreign language.
Yet the First Amendment has been construed to
include certain of those rights.JO
Justice Douglas mentioned Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
·Meyer v. Nebraska, and NAACP v. Alabama, as granting such peripheral rights to individuals and said that "without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure. 11 31
Guaranteeing the penumbral rights of privacy, he said, are
various rights and the peripheral rights which emanate from them:
The right of association contained in the penumbra
of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of
peace without the consent of the ovmer is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment expli-,
citly affirms the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
20

/Poe v. Ullman,

3°381

.

J~7

u.s. 479, 482.

Jlibid. , 483.

U.S. 497, 517

(19~1).
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government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment, The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.J2
Thus the basis for the Court's ruling that the contraceptive statute of Connecticut was unconstitutional was
the "penumbral" right to marital privacy created by various
"emanations" from the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.

The reason that Justice Douglas formulated this

basis is discernible early in the opinion when he notes that
the appellants urge their claim upon the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause:
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner
v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 1905 should be our euide.
But we decline that invitation as we did in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, JOO U.S. 379 1947 - ••.
(et al:) JJ
Justice Douglas obviously shied away from the "invitation" to reinvigorate the activist due process dogma of
the Lochner era since the modern court's "hands off" stance
would hardly allow it.

In perhaps an effort to allay the

Court's fears, he said:
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions,J4
Perhaps a reason for his formulating such a broad opinion
was the hope of drawing together his dissident majority by
eliminating the suggestion that the Court was attempting to
encroach upon the state's powers to guard the healttt and

3 2 Ibid.,
Amendments.
33rbid., 482.
34 rbid.,
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morals of its citizens.

Nevertheless, he shrewdly included

some very able grounds for finding the statute unconstitutional as an infringement of due process when he said:
Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar
principle, so often applied by this Court, that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.35
Differing Evaluations on the Court
Indeed, the new fundamental right to privacy which
arose from the "penumbras" of the Constitution seemed to
attract some of the justices' attentions away from the spirit
of substantive due process woven throughout the decision.
Nevertheless, there was still sharp disagreement on the Court
concerning the "totality of the Constitution" as the basis
for the privacy right.

Discussion centered on the determi-

nation of exactly what part of the Bill of Rights justified
a new constitutional right broader than the traditional First,
Fourth, or Fifth Amendment approaches.
Justice Goldberg rejected any necessity for a "penumbral" theory and argued that the right was fundamental through
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.

First, he relied on

the due process clause-which "protects those personal rights
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific
terms of the Bill of Rights. 11 36 The Ninth, he said, reveals
that the Framers
·believed that there are additional fundamental
rir;hts, rrotected fro;:i sc·
~ + ~ 1. in::~~. !:".'0r':e:nt'
which exist alongside those fu~~~~en~al riGhts
0

35rbid., 485.
3 6rbid. , 486.

-:·-'

:-
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specifically mentioned in the first eieht
Constitutional Amendments.J7
To somewhat abate the arguments lodged by strict
constructionists like Justice Black against such liberal
interpretations of the Nintn and Fourteenth Amendments,
Goldberg made these pointss
(1) In determining which rights are fundamental,
judges are not left at large to decide cases in
light of their personal and private notions. Rather,
they must look to the "traditions and (collective)
conscience of our people" to determine whether a
principle is "so rooted (there) ..• as to be ranked
as fundamental." JR
(2) (Dissenters] would permit experimentation by the
States in the area of the fundamental personal riehts
of citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution
grants such power either to the states or to the
Federal Government. J9
·
(J) Finally, it should be said of the Court's
holding today that it in no way interferes with a
State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity
or misconduct. 40

Justice Harlan, who in his Poe dissent had referred
to the "liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment as a "rational
continuum," 41 argued in a concurring opinion that
the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is
whether this ••• statute infringes the Due Process
Clause ••• because the enactment violates basic values
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 42
11

Conceding a point to Justice Douglas' opinion, that "relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to.one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights," he nevertheless concluded
that "it is not dependent on them or on any of their revelations."

37 I-bid •• 488.
JSibid., 493.

JC

/Ibid . .

.

40 Ibid. , 498.

41 367

u.s. 497, 543.

42 381 U.S. 479, 500.
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Furthermore, " [t1he Due Process Clause • • • stands on its
own bottom." 4 3
Justice White, in his concurrence, based the unconstitutionality of the Connecticut statute on its "sweeping
scope ••• with its telling effect on the freedoms of married
persons" and on its unreasonableness to the state's stated
purposes banning illicit sexual relationships.

He, there-

fore, concluded that the statute "deprives such persons of
liberty without due process of law."

However, he stressed

that the due process clause should not be used to invalidate
statutes "if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a
legitimate and substantial state interest and not arbitrary
. .
.
or capricious
in
app l'icat.ion. .,44
As expected, the dissenters, Justices Black and
Stewart, took offense with the natural law-fundamental lawdue process approach of the majority.

First, however, Jus-

tice Black challenged the new "right to privacys"
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of
privacy" as though there is some constitutional
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever
to be passed which might abridge the "privacy"
of individuals. But there is not. There are,
of course, guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part
to protect privacy at certain times and places
with respect to certain activities. Such, for
example, is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against "unreasonable searches and seizures." 45
However, with regard to the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee of privacy, he said:
It belittles that amendment to talk about it as
though it protects nothi Yl~ but "pri ..,acv. " To

4 3rbid ••
44 Ibid., 507;
45Ibid., 509.
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treat it that way is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not the ldnd of liberal reading I think
any Bill of Rights provision should be given.46
Furthermore, he said.that the Court uses the term "right to
privacy" as a "comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against searches and seizures, 114 7 As a
strict constructionist, he viewed it as a term that "can
easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also ,,, easily
be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things
other than searches and seizures ••,4 ·3 Finally, concerning
the overall decision of the Court, he said:
like my privacy c:.s well as the next one, but'
am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited
by some specific constitutional provision.49
I
I

Concerning some of the justices' use of the due
process clause and the Ninth Amendment as bases for finding
the statute unconstitutional, Justice Black found the two
to be the same thing--merely using different words
to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary
power t·o invalidate any legislative act which the
judges find irrational, unreasonable, or offensive.50
Concerning the Ninth Amendment especially, he said that use
of "such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of
this Court's members a day-to-day consti tutiona.l convention, u5l
Justice Black obviously drew the conclusion that the
Court had in Griswold revived the due process clause "with
an 'arbitrary and capricious' or 'shocking to the conscience'

46 rbid. , 509.
4 7Ibid ..

. 48 Ibid ..
49 Ibid., 5iO.
50ibid. , 511.
51 Ibid., 520,
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.formula," whereas he had hoped "that we had laid that formula,
as a means for striking do\'m state legislation,. to rest once
and for all ...... 5 2
Justice Stewart, dissentine, believed the Connecticut
statute to be "an uncommonly silly law," but agreed with Justice Black that "we are not asked in this case to say whether
we think this law is unwise, or even asinine."

He said, fur-

thermore, that "we are asked to hold that it violates the
United States Constitution.

And that I cannot do."53

Justice Stewart particularly attacl::ed the Ninth Amendment approach of Justice Goldberg, saying that it "turn [s]
somersaults with history ... 54 He felt rather that the Ninth,
like the Tenth Amendment, was
framed ... and adopted .•. simply to make clear
that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not
alter the plan, that the Federal Government was
to be a government of express and limited po\'/ers,
and that all rights and powers not delegated to
it were retained by the people and the individual
States~55

Although the seven justices in the majority disagreed on the specific underpinnings of claims of right to
privacy, they did agree that the contraceptive statute had
invaded an area considered to be fundamentally and intimately private--the relationship of husband and wife,
Whether a value "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
or an "emanation" of the penumbral right of association of the
5 2 Ibid., 522 .

.53rbid. , 527.
54 Ibid. , 529.
55Ibid., 530.
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First Amendment as Justice Douglas urged,5 6the right to
marital privacy is a constitutional right.
However, unlike some rights which the Court holds
"absolute," especially those guaranteed in the First Amendment, the new right to marital privacy was qualified in
several majority opinions so as not to be interpreted too
broadly or absolutely.

Justice Goldberg had said that it

would not interfere "with a state's proper regulation of
sexual promiscuity or misconduct"57and that "the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling. 11 5 8 Justice White had made it clear that
states could enact statutes "reasonably necessary for the
effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest
and not arbitrary or capricious in application."59

Reaction to Griswold
While the facts of the case dealt only with those
limited to marital privacy, its reasoning was certainly
intended to be applicable to many other unspecified situations.

It was this fact of broadness and ambiguity, along

with the shaky basis of the new right to privacy, with no
specific provision of the Constitution to sustain it, that
caused a general feeling of skepticism among legal analysts.
56"Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet
it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved
. .
" Tb.
1n our prior d ec1s1ons.
_ i d . , 4R5
,
•
7
5 rbid., 498.
5Sibid. , 497 •.
59Ibid., 507.
0

•
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As if these considerations did not make the pronouncement

of a unitary right to privacy novel enough, it could also
be noted that the decision ignored the technical "trespass"
requirements which had guided the Court when confronted
with.Fourth Amendment claims to privacy.

Since there had

been no police entry into the bedroom of the appellants or
those married couples for whom they sought relief, no "trespass" argument could be substantiated. 60 The Court had
divorced its decision, therefore, from the "preferred position" given to "propertied privacy" in criminal prosecutions and from the traditional declaration of a privacy
right only within a specified provision of the Bill of Rights.
Philosophical Criticism
In primarily a philosophical disagreement with the
Court, Ernest Van Den Haag called the Court's opinion "an
elaborate 'jeu de mots' in which different senses of the
word 'privacy' were punned upon and the legal concept generally mismanaged in ways too various to recount."

Van Den

Haag felt that rather than "privacy," the issue was "autonomy" since the government was attempting to "regulate" personal affairs, not "get acquainted" with them.

He sympa-

thized with the conceptual difficulties "if the confusion
was inadvertent," but "if deliberate, admired the Court's
ingenuity!"

Van Den Haag criticized the Court, however,

for having "muddled the separate issues" of "privacy" and
60Al thou-;h Just ice '.Jou_r::las, :":a;:eu·1e ri;;.e: to find as
many grounds as possible fa:::" "the right to privacy, asked
the moot question: "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions c.r nrivacy surrounding the marriage relationship."
Ibid. , 485-6. ·

44
"autonomy" and suggested that conventional grounds should
have been used for the decision, such as arbitrary interference with personal liberty in contravention of the due process clause or even an endeavor to establish a particular
religious tenet in violatioh of the First Amendment. 61
In agreement with Van Den Haag's philosophical argument was Hyman Gross who regarded the Griswold opinion as unsatisfactory as the decision was reached by "punning" on the
privacy concept.

He felt as did Van Den Haag that Griswold

only contributed to the "conceptual muddle" around privacy. 62
Robert Dixon found the case "longer on yearning than
ort substantive content" and saw the concept of intrinsic privacy becoming so blurred in judicial usage as to make its
"reasoned evolution ... quite difficult, if not impossible."
Dixon felt that in order to narrow the field of privacy from
the general "laissez faire" policy of a general freedom of
action, the Court should think of "right to privacy" in terms
of limits upon government's powers to force exposure, thus
involving personal secrecy in conduct and ideas, plus the
factor of solitude, involving freedom from certain social
impositions and pressures.

Dixon saw an additional dimension

in Griswold of neither secrecy nor solitude, but a "right to
access to information relevant to the specific condition of
privacy·at issue."

Thus, he said that Griswold, by adding

61 Ernest Van Den Haag, "On Privacy," in Pri V.EC'':
Yearbook of the American Societv for Political and leg§l.l
Philosonhv, No. 13, ed: Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman
(New York: Atherton Press, 1971), pp. l~0-1, 1R7,
"?
0

.

-:-:yman Gross, ":he Concept of ?!'.'i vac~/, " :·iew ·,'o:-::
University Law Review 42 (:/arch 1967): 35.
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this dimension, did little to clarify privacy's conceptual
dimensions.

Furthermore, the Griswo).g opinion,. he said,

provides varied and flexible underpinnings to fit
those situations that don't fit into established
categories neatly but still seem to rest on values
thought to be vital and which, for lack of a better
term, are called pr'ivacy.6J
Cr1 ticism of Appellants' Standine;:
The first issue which critics challenged aside from
the use of the "privacy" concept itself was Justice Douglas'
broad approach to standing, allowing the defendant clinic
supervisors to raise the rights of married couples not before the Court.

This approach in itself raised the privacy

question, for it submerged the question of whether the state
had the power to regulate birth control clinics or whether

the regulatory legislation was a reasonable means to accomplish the state's purpose of discouraging sexual promis·cuity.

These basic and difficult questions were virtually

glossed over by the Court's rush to get into the business of
privacy.

(Noteworthy is the fact that the attorneys for the

appellants indicated in their briefs that the bases of the
appeal were a due process test of whether the statute was a
reasonable means to achieve a proper legislative purpose, and
a First Amendment test of whether the statute also violated
appellants' freedom of expression to disseminate information
and advise their patients. 64 )
Robert Dixon had this to say about the decision on
appellants' standing:
6J
.
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., "The Griswold ?enumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?".Michigan
Law Review 64 (December 1965)~ 197, 204-5.
64Ibid., p. 215.
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Suffice it to say for the present that unless
some kind of information-access theory is recognized as implicit in Griswold, then it stands as
a decision without a satisfying rationale. At
least it will stand thus except for those who can
join the Court in using the ploy of "standine" to
remake the actual birth-control-clinic situation
into a marital-use-of-contraceptives situation.65
The "standing" issue was important to the manner in
which Justice Douglas arrived at the conclusion that the privacy of marriage had been invaded.

Robert Dixon, continuing

with his line of criticism, thus said:
With the issue thus remade, we have a modern morality play, with much judicial fingershaking at
fictional police invading a fictional bedchamber
of a fictional couple in search of evidence of the
use of contraceptives, The actual result of Gris~gld may be applauded, but to reach this result,
was it necessary to play charades with the Constitution?66
Constitutional Underpinnings
There seems to be a common assumption among a good
number of those who reviewed Griswold that although the enunciation of a unitary right to privacy was novel, the theory
behind it was not,

It was compared to the natural rights

theory which had been used to find police procedures unconstitutional abridgments of the basic rights of human
dignity as in Rochin where police procedures were weighed
on the scales of "conduct that shocks the conscience

.. .

which offends the community's sense of fair play and decency, "67 Also, Griswold's enunciation of a right to privacy
was theoretically the same as the idea that we have certain
basic riehts "implicit in the conceut of ordered li bert'r"

(1952).
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which had been expressed in Palko,

~!apo, Irvine, and Rochin. 68

.One analyst of the Griswold opinion said that
the Court has no need to search for an identifiable, traditional "right to privacy" to justify
the decision (since the Connecticut statute was
simply inconsistent. with the concept of reasonable liberty) .•. which due process of law has come
to connote for us and which we must let our nine
justices apply.69
For these same reasons, yet another Court observer said,
"the cases t a t es no new th eory •... .,7o
There was also opposition to the focus of five justices on the Ninth Amendment.7 1 Those already opposed to
the breadth and multiplicity of the zones of privacy suggested by Justice Douglas felt that the focus on the Ninth
did not help to narrow those zones: "Mr. Goldberg's approach, in short, does not offer assistance in defining
privacy, but is at least congenial to further probing and
experimentation." 7 2
At least two Court observers were generally pleased

68Angela R. Holder, "Old Wine in New Bottles? The

Right to Privacy and Future School Prayer Cases," Journal
of Church and State 12 (Spring 1970): 302.
69Robert B. McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations," Michigan Law Review 64 (December 19665):
277. 288.
70Paul G. Kauper, "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations,
Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case,"
Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 251.
71 r.1any Court observers were surprised when five justices accepted the invitation to consider the Ninth Amendment. Justice Douglas included it among the enumerated rights
from which the "penumbral" right to privacy could be deri.i.re-1,
with Justice Clark concurring. Justices concurring with Goldberg's more extensive reliance on the Ninth were Warren and
Brennan. See Thomas I. Emerson, "Nine Justices in Search of
,....,,n T___"'VT
::i .-,~·i c.··r /--L~
?l <;
a Doctrl. ne
. , .~.7i-- ch~
.... --..,·-·
...
... ( ;:,-,co ....·her ior)5).. ..__._,,.
7 2Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra, p. 207.
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with the Court's efforts in Griswold.

William M. Beaney in

1962 had urged that the Court "work out a right· to privacy
based on the 'liberty' concept in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments" or provisions of the First Amendment "since the
inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment suggests that other constitutional sources of protection for the right need cultivation. 1173 After the Griswold pronouncement, Beaney said:
The disagreement of members of the majority as to
the Constitutional underpinning of the claim is
less important than the fact that they agreed that
a right to privacy had a constitutional basis.74
Thomas I. Emerson said that "the Court's choice of
the privacy doctrine, as the basis of its decision seems
sound" and that the doctrine "represents the narrowest and
most precise formula available, and the one most relevant
to the issues presented."

He felt that the creation of the

privacy right "meets a critical need of society, and the
new doctrine seems to have a viable and significant future."75
Importance and Scope of Griswold
Actually, there were numerous possibilities for
dealing with the Griswold case: the equal protection clause,
the First Amendment, substantive due process, the right to
privacy, or the Ninth Amendment. 76 The importance of the
case lay, however, in which choice was made and how it was
proposed to be applied.

In the equal protection area there

73william M. Eeaney, "The Constitutiorial Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court," in The 1962 Supreme Court Review,
ed: Philip B. Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
196J), pp. 250-51.
74 william M. Beaney, "The Right to Privacy and American
Law," Law and Contemuorarv Problems Jl (Spring 1966): 263.
75Emerson, "Nine .Justices," p. 233.
7 6see generally, Emerson, ibid., for an excellantdiscussion of these alternatives.
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were two possible claimss first, that the enforcement of the
statute only against birth control clinics was discrimination against lower income classes of people, and second, that
the statute effectively favored unmarried persons as against
married couples?? The use of the First Amendment claim would
be possible only if a majority would allow it to be broadly
interpreted so as to include conduct, since the case involved
actual dispensing of contraceptives.

Substantive due process

would be a difficult route since, as previously mentioned,
it summoned up the long-dead "Lochner" approach, besides involving the Court in making a purely moral judgment on a controversial issue.

The Ninth Amendment had never been used

to overturn a state statute, and was too untried to be used
here to build a court majority.
For these reasons it can be inferred that the Court
had no choice but to establish a new constitutional right to
privacy.

After having decided on the objective, the course

had to be charted.

It involved three problemsa (1) source of

the right, (2) standards for application, and (3) scope of
its application.

Sources have been extensively discussed

through the opinions of the justices.

The standards, how-

ever, were not made very clear by the Court.

Justice· Douglas

seems to distinguish between the constitutionally invalid prohibition of

~

and the constitutionally permissible state regu-

lation of manufacture or sale.

He also alludes to the undue

??contraceptives could be sold in Connecticut for
prevention of diseq.sA, therefor9 favorin<": singles a~d -:;~;:-sow:
engaged in extra-marital rela~ions. Ibid., p. 220,
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breadth of the Connecticut law.7 8
Justice Goldberg took the ''undue breadth" approach,
but also tbok a balancing approach as a standard for applying
the right to privacy, placing a heavy burden of justification on the state.

It is the Goldberg approach which was

suggested by one Court observer to be the likely standard
for future decisions dealing with privacy interests.
,,, a balancing of factors, with the government
required to show a "compelling interest" supplemented bv doctrines of undue breadth, vagueness
and the feasibility of alternative measures,79
As to the third problem involved in effectively
enunciating a constitutional right to privacy--scope of its
application--the Court gave only subtle hints.

It was the

potential ramifications of the new right to privacy that
had observers in 1965 wondering what was to come. However
skeptical many observers of the Court were concerning the
legal

underpi~nings

of the right to privacy, one of them

noted that the "greater significance" of Griswold was the
Court's "forthright declaration, finally, that it would recognize as constitutional, claims of liberty not specifically
tied to enumerations of the Bill of Rights, 80 Professor
Alan F, Westin, who is recognized as an authority on privacy
in America, felt that favorable public reactions to the Griswold decision legitimized his position that a right to privacy
.
81
is "vital to the present era."
In 1966 Westin defended the
78 J81

u.s.

4 79, 4 85.
79Emerson, ."Nine Justices," pp. 230-1.
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panding Right to Privacy," ',•/isconsinia~Review ( 1966): 9:~5.
81 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Athe.
neum, 1967), p. 355.
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unitary right to privacy in this statement:
If the Supreme Court's actions in the past fifteen years are viewed not as an extension of particular provisions of the Bill of Rights but as a
case-by-case evolution of a function~}, constitutional theory of personal and ~roup privacy,
the concept of privacy does not at all emerge
as a "negative" concept in the Court's jurisprudence; it serves to protect positive needs
of individuals and ore:anizations in our society.·.82
However, it appeared to other observers that the
"penumbral" theory of privacy "would enable the Court to
move its peripheries out boundlessly and at will." 8 3 This
fear was dismissed by sor.:e who said the scope of Griswold
was generally misunderstood by failing to distinguish from
the Court's dicta the actual holding which did not require
84
the right to privacy to be absolute in every matter.
Nevertheless, it was certain that the very breadth and vagueness of the opinion left the door open for "continued probing and refinement of the privacy principle." 8 5
If the scope of the right were measured strictly by
the holding of the Court, and not the dicta, one would be
concerned only with the treatment of the only specific privacy right mentioned--right of "marital privacy"--or in Justice Goldberg's opinion--rights of "marital privacy," the
"marital home," and "to marry and raise a family."

Thus,

it would have been conceivable that the Court would consider

82Alan F. Westin, "Science, Privacy, and Freedom:
Issues and Proposals for the 1970's," part 2: "Balancing the
Conflicting Demands of Privacy, Disclosure, and Surveillance,"
Columbia Law Review 66 (November 1966): 1234.
BJPercival ~. cTackson, ~j.::::s:nit_1;i ~he SUt?~3'.:": Co.::.:_".'+;,
(Norman, C•kla.: Universit:,· o: Cl~la!lorr.a ?ress, l'.7·:!9), p. 52.u.
84Holder, "Old Wine," p. 2R9.
85Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra," p. 205.
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a right to privacy constitutionally recognizable only in
the marriage relationship.

However, since the

~ourt

no-

where in the opinion made such a limitation on its power
in future cases involving privacy interests, it was not a
reasonable prediction,
since constitutional doctrines have a way of expanding beyond the boundaries of the original case
Cand] • • • where, as here, the right established is
one which responds so acutely to the growing needs
of the society.86

If there existed the real possibility for the privacy doctrine to expand, at least in the context of marriage, family, procreation, and raising children, it was
possible that action by the government to compel or limit
births would also come within the invasion of privacy rights.
The Griswold case thus held implications for sterilization
laws, abortion laws, and government imposed birth control

programs~? It was possible for the right to privacy even
to extend to other sex laws prohibiting such acts as adultery, homosexuality, and "perverse" sexual acts, although
Justices Goldberg and White had expressly disclaimed that
intention in their opinions.

It was even conceivable that

the right to privacy would be employed in a variety of other
situations, such as electronic eavesdropping, various police
practices, government investigations, loyalty oaths, official
records of arrest, and the procedures of investigation in. socia
. 1 we lf are a d minis
. . t ra t.ion. 88
vo 1ve d in

86Emerson, "Nine Justices," p. 2JJ.
87 rbid. I ·P· 232.
88 Ibid., pp. 232-JJ,
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To be sure, the Griswold decision was vague, "and
it is a certainty that when the Supreme Court of the United
States employs vagueness in a decision, it is guaranteeing
future litigation. 118 9 With the assurance of litigation,
the Court would face several choices: whether to narrow the
priva6y right, or use it at all; whether to seek a traditional course for protecting the "unenumerated liberties"
through the due process or equal protection clauses; or
whether to broadly interpret other enumerated rights such
as the First and Fourth Amendments as they protect individual privacy.
8 9Holder, "Old Wine," p. 302.

CHAPI'ER III
THE COURSE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
AFTER GRISWOLD
Several generalizations made after the Griswold
decision now furnish meaningful insight into the Court's
theory of a constitutional right to privacy almost a decade
late rs
(1) Development of the right to privacy was still
subject to "continuing probing and refinement."1
(2) Griswold created "varied and flexible underpinnings to fit those situations that don't fit
into established categories neatly but still seem
to rest on values thought to be vital"2

(3) The likely standard for measuring right to
privacy claims would be the Goldberg approach of
a "balancing of factors" including the government's
showing of a "compelling interest," "undue breadth"
or "vagueness," and "feasibility of alternative
measures."3
(4) "The actual holdings ••• did not require the
right to privacy to be absolute in every matter."4

(5) The "vagueness" of the Griswold opinion was a
guarantee of future litigation.5
1Robert G. Dixon, "The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?" Michigan Law
Review 64 (December 1965): 205.
2 Ibid ••
)Thomas I. Emerson, "Nine Justices in Searcl:t of a
Doctrine," Michigan Law Review 64 (December 1965): 2Jl.
4Angela R. Holder, "Old Wine in New Bottles? The
Right of

?ri~rac:i ~~d

:7~. 1tu~e

:~choc 1 l

?~'J.~·'·:r

of Churcfi and State 12 (Spring 1970): 289 •
.5rbid., p. 302.
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All of these points have been relevant to the Court's
determination of privacy rights since Griswold. The fact that
decisions since Griswold upholding a privacy right have been
based not on the "penumbral" theory but on an enumerated
guarantee, either the First or Fourth Amendment or the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, tends to support fully the prediction that the privacy right was subject to "continuing probing and refinement."
Griswold_ 's "varied and flexible underpinnings 1 laid the groundwork for a variety of personal privacy claims to be upheld
through the use of due process, equal protection, and specifically enumerated rights.

Such balancing factors as "vague-

ness," "compelling state interest," "undue breadth," and
I

I

"feasibility of alternative measures" became the standards
for weighing the right to privacy against the state's interest and finding it "not .•. to be absolute in every matter .. "
Although the privacy right was not found to be absolute in every matter, the constitutional holding of Gri.§..Y[old
was flexible enough to reach into such areas as protecting
pornographic materials in the home and guaranteeing the rights
to marry whomever one chooses, to have or not to have children,
and to make personal decisions in matters of family life. Finally, as to the last statement quoted above, the "vagueness"
of Griswold has definitely generated litigation, for among
those claims of privacy which followed Griswold, other than
those just mentioned, were claims of rights to determine personal appearance· and

hairsty~e

a~d

to

co~munal

and

ot~er ~on-

traditional lifestyles, besides the many cases in criminal

56
action which were appealed on claims of invasion of privacy.
After Griswold came more practical applications of
the privacy doctrine.

Such high sounding natural rights

theories as Justice \'/illiam Douglas had expressed in Gr:i.s_!Yold
were rarely heard from the Court in relation to the privacy
claims it faced.

The Court seemed bent on refusing to use

the "penumbral" rights theory, althoue;h it significantly reaffirmed First and }'ourth Amendment rights of privacy in the
past decade. 6 However, privacy rights protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment, involving a variety of personal situations, were not based on a general right of privacy, but on
the sexual, marital, and familial privacy rights enunciated
in Griswold.
Since Griswold, two separate branches7of the privacy
right are distinguishable: the first involving protection of
the home and personal possessions, including personal thoughts
and conduct, primarily through First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights and the guarantee against

self~incrimination

in the

Fifth Amendment, and the second branch--the area specifically
protected in Griswold--involving protection of sexual intimacies and personal decisions affecting marriage, procreation,

6u.s. Senator Sam Ervin, D-N.C., Chairman of the Senate

Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, has said that on the basis of the complaints received by the committee, he has concluded that
the great majority of the grievances vrhich individuals voice today about invasions of privacy are
nothing more or less than violations of constitutional guarantees, especially those contained in the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments .•• "
Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., "Privacv and the Constitution," North
Car,_o"""'l=i~n=a'--:::_-'-2-i'l ~eview 50 (Au;:ust 197!:): 1017.
---7This theory has been adapted from "Application of the
Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals from
Public Employment," Duke Law Journal (December 1973): 1044-5.
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child bearing, and child rearing, through the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The right of privacy appears to have become two-fold, implying "secrecy" in the first area and both "solitude" and
"autonomy" in the latter.

Secrecy is an appropriate desig-

nation for the first area, expressed primarily as the home
and personal possessions, including conduct and ideas, because it is an area which the government seeks to invade
by forcing exposure of personal actions and ideas.

Soli-

tude and autonomy denote an intimate area of privacy in
which the government is not necessarily snooping or forcing
exposure, but in which it may attempt to interfere or regulate.
I,

These two general areas will serve as the organiza-

i

tional framework for the following survey of privacy cases
with which the Court has dealt from the Griswold decision
in 1965 through May 1974.

Under Personal Secreqy in the

_Home and Possessions, Including Conduct and Ideas, the following will be discussed: unreasonable search and seizure
and surveillance, privacy of the home, privacy of association, and privacy of personal information.

Under Solitude

and Autonomy, Involving Personal Intimacies and

D~cisions,

privacy of marriage, family, procreation, abortion, childrearing, and sexuality will be discussed.

The first area of

privacy involving personal secrecy is discussed to determine
whether the Court's traditional regard for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment guarantees of privacy from Boyd through Mapp and

to be related by the Court to the new general right of privacy
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which was announced in Griswold.
Privacy cases which relied explicitly on Griswold,
and those which did 'not, will then be analyzed statistically,
and that findii:g will be compared with conclusions this study
has made about.the trend of decisions affecting privacy interests. Finally, an area of privacy involving personal secrecy which the Court has not yet dealt with adequately-government accumulation of personal information--will be discussed along with the outlook for protection of privacy by
other agents of the government.
Personal Secrecy in the Home and Possessions,
Including Conduct and Ideas

J

Freedom from Unreasonable
Se~rches and Seizures
In the area of safeguards for privacy in the Fourth
Amendment, such as the prohibition of "unreasonable" searches
and seizures and the requirement for warrants to issue only
upon "probable cause," the Court continued to delineate the
permissible scope of searches and to qualify standards of
"reasonableness."

In Chimel v. California, 395

u.s. 752

(1969), the Court reversed a conviction on the grounds that
the search, though here incident to a lawful arrest, violated
.
the Fourth Amendment's
test of "reasonableness." 8 However,

in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.

__ , 94

S. Ct. 467

(1973), "reasonableness" included more than a search of the
suspect's outer clothing for weapons.
8~

Justice Lewis F.

;:)ee R.ic h ar d t.1'". G· 2.nr!cn, "f'h.
. , ,_!"'le 1 ''. '"' 8- i i· .c-_ o!:'n i_• a- - ,.·J?l.reas onable Risks of Unreasonable Invasions of Privacy:-" Cregon Law Review 49 (June 1970): 411.
1
.....
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Powell, Jr., concurring in Robinson, said:
The search incident to arrest is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy
interest protected by the constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest.9
Citing Robinson as precedent, the Court in Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S.

~•

94 s. Ct. 488 (1973), affirmed the

conviction of possession of marijuana after a search and
seizure subsequent to arrest.
In Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,

3~7

U.S. 294

(1967), the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' protections were
claimed to have been abridged by the seizure of incriminating
materials.

However, the Court upheld the seizure since the

materials were "evidentiary,"

Justice Douglas dissented on

the grounds that the right to privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment with regard to personal effects had been
unconstitutionally invaded.

He spoke of the Court's tradi-

tional regard for privacy from Boyd through MapR and said:
"This right of privacy, sustained in Griswold, is kin to the
right of privacy created by the Fourth Arnendrnent. 1110
One of the Burger Court's most recent decisions involving the search and seizure of evidentiary material from
an arrestee's body was in United States v. Edwards, 42 USLW

4463 (1974).

The Court held there that the Fourth Amendment

should not be extended to exclude from evidence certain
clothing taken from the arrestee while he is in custody.
Joining in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Potter
Stewart· were Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, and

994 S. Ct. 467, 494.
10387 u.s. 294, 324.
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Thurgood Marshalls
The intrusio~ here was hardly a chocking one, and
it cannot be said that the police acted in bad
faith. The Fourth Amendment, however, was not
designed to apply only to situations where the
intrusion is massive and the violation of privacy
shockingly flagrant. Rather, as the Court's
classic admonition in Boyd .•. put the matters
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its
mildest and least repulsive forn: but illegitimate and un~onstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, •• , 11
11

In two recent cases involving compulsory disclosure to the government of personal financial records, the
Court reached two distinctly similar conclusions about the
privacy claims asserted.

In the first case, Couch v,

United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), where government's demand of an individual's tax records was claimed to have violated his right to privacy, the Court held that the privacy interest could not be claimed since the appellant had
surrendered his privacy right when he gave his records to
his accountant.

More important, however, was the additional

conclusion by the Court that privacy was not a claim here
since much of tax information is public property anyway.
Since the disclosure of the tax information exerted no "physical or moral compulsion," the criteria for Fifth Amendment privacy protection had not been met. 12
In the second case, California Bankers
v, Shultz, 94

s.

Aspociatio~

Ct. 1494 (1974), the Court upheld the con-

troversial- Bank Secrecy Act which requires in part that banks
11 42 usr:1 4l~tSJ, 4tr:7 ( 1974).
12 .

409

u.s. 322, JJ6 (197J),
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disclose the names of those involved in domestic transactions of $10,000 or more.

On the basis of standing, the

Court overturned a lower court's ruling that the domestic
disclosure requirement invaded the Fourth Amendment right
of privacy.

However, the Court, relying in part on Couch,

said there was no invasion here of either a Fourth Amendment
right or a right of privacy through the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment, since the "mere maintenance''
by the banks of records required no disclosure to the government without due legal process. 1 3 Furthermore, the Court
sustained the government's contention that the law's provisions were a constitutionally permissible means to counter
increasingly sophisticated crime.

The dissenters were two

"right to privacy" advocates, Justices Douglas and Marshall.
Justice Douglas said that "customers have a constitutionally
justifiable expectation of privacy in the documentary details of the financial transactions reflected in their bank
accounts." 14
In criminal cases involving seizures of physical properties of the body, the Court has not extended a right of privacy through the Fourth Amendment, the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth_, or through the Griswold decision, to protect the plaintiffs.

In

Schme~ber

v. California, J94 U.S.

757 (1966), the Court rejected a Fourth and Fifth Amendments'

challenge to a compulsory blood-alcohol test since the test
was "reasonable" and imposed no risk, and the probable cause

l394 S. Ct. 1494, 151J-14 (1974).
14Ibid., p. 1~27.
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for defendant's arrest justified the test.

Both Justices

William Douglas and Hugo Black dissented in Schmerber,

Jus-

tice Douglas said that he adhered to the views he expressed
in his Breithaunt dissent, adding that since Griswold, the

right to privacy was held to be within the penumbra of some
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.

Justice Black

dissented, saying that the Court had wrongly departed from
the teachings of Boyd, broadly construing the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.
Following the rejection of the privacy challenge in
Schmerber, the Court upheld in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 213 (1967), the requirement for a defendant to exhibit

his person for observation by prosecution witnesses at a
post-indictment lineup.

Also relying on Schmerber, but citing

the "reasonableness" rule of Chimel, the Court even held
permissible in Cupp, Penitentiary Supt, v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291 (1973), the taking of incriminating samples of dried

blood from a suspect's fingernails in the course of his arrest.

However, in Davis v. rr:ississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969),

the Court overturned a rape conviction on the grounds that
fingerprinting petitioner without a warrant and using the
results to convict him constituted a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights since there had been adequate opportunity
for police to obtain a warrant.

Justice Black dissented on

the grounds that the decision was
but one more in an ever-expanding list of cases
in which this Court has been so widely blowing
up tl:e ?·ourth ..:i.;:;e:::i::.2r:t 's scope tha·: its origir:::-:'
1 .~
authors would be hard put to recognize their creation:.)

15394

u.s.

721, 729 (1969).
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Thus, Fourth and Fifth Amendment privacy interests
in search and seizure cases involving police procedures continued to be balanced against the state's interest in selfprotection by such tests as "reasonableness," "fact of arrest," and the necessity for seizine "evidentiary" material,
especially when evidence was liable to be moved away if not
seized immediately.

However, in the area of administrative

searches, the Court overruled its 1957 Frank decision.
Frank had left unanswered the question of what grounds must
be present to justify the inspector's right to enter one's
home, and doubts developed about the viability of the decision, especially since two members of the bare majority in
Frank--Justices Felix Frankfurter and Charles E. Whittaker-had retired from the Court.

Camara v. r.:unicipal Court of

City and Co. of San Francisco, 397 U.S. 523 (1967), held that
the Fourth Amendment prevents prosecution for a citizen's
refusal to permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection
of a personal residence,

The Court required that

i~spections

meet reasonable legislative or administrative standards. In
a companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967),
the Fourth was held to apply equally to business premises.
However, in another administrative search case, Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), a New York State caseworker's
"visit" at a welfare recipient's home was upheld as ."reasonable" and the Court upheld the termination of welfare
benefits . 16
16
see Wayne R. ia?ave, "Admini strati ve Searches 2 ~,r;
the Fourth Amendment: The Canara and See Cases," in The 1967
Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B, Kurland (Chicago: University of Ch~c:;.~o Press, 1968), p. 33, where he says the Camara
and See decisions were not enough, Even more critical,~-
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Freedom From
Unreasonable SurveillanQe
The Court still refused to hold electronic surveillance unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
The privacy interests involved were not deemed compelling
unless physical "trespass" had been involved, as in United
States v, Black, J84 U.S. 98J (1966), where a spike microphone ·inserted into a wall to monitor defendant's conversation was held to be a "trespass" and therefore an abride;ement of Fourth Amendment rights. Yet in Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. J2J (1967), the use of a hidden recording
device on the person of a federal agent to record incriminating statements which defendant made to the agent, was
upheld by the Court. Justice Douglas dissented, advocating
the recognition here of a constitutional right to privacy.
His often-quoted opinion is increasingly relevant to the
age of electronic surveillance:
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy,
where everyone is open to surveillance at all
times, where there are no secrets from government, The aggressive breaches of privacy by the
Government increase by geometric proportions.
Wiretapping and "bue;ging" run rampant, without
effective judicial or legislative control.
Secret television circuits in industry, extending even to restrooms, are common .•.•
These examples and many others demonstrate an
alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity
of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps.17
'
says, is the need to ensure that authorized inspections are
conducted with as little intrusion upon the citizen's {nonrebel's)- privacy as possible. "The aspect of privacy of
greatest concern to the greatest number of people is not rebe1ling against the inspection, but havine the inspection at
a convenient time." This type of litigation, he concedes, is
infrequent, and it is unlikely the Court will be called upon
to provide this protection, Therefore, the "only hope" is
legislative and administrative self-control and a developing
sensitivity to the problem. See also Daniel M. Migliore and
Ronald D, Ray,
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The Court in BergP.r v, New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967),
seemed to signal some change in the Court's direction, by
holding that wiretapping was under Fourth Amendment sanctions and by invalidating a New York statute authorizing
official wiretapping.

The Court reversed by 6 to 3 the con-

viction of Ralph Berger for conspiracy to bribe the chairman of the state liquor authority, since evidence had been
obtained by wiretaps.

But no clearcut opinion emerged;

three statements were delivered by the majority and three
by the minority.

Even Justice Douglas in the majority and

Justice Black in the minority agreed on one points Olmstead
had been overturned.

Justice Tom

c.

Clark, however, writing

one of his last opinions before his resignation, did not
.

. 18

say so, nor did the other Justices.

Greater unanimity prevailed less than a year later
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the
Court said that government agents involved in electronic
eavesdropping were obligated to follow the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. 1 9"Suspicion" was not enough. A warrant was required,

The Court emphasized that it would not

make all bugging impermissible, but that the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance wquld be permissible
when preceded by a warrant.

The Court, however, did make

"national security" and other prescribed areas, such as
kidnapping, exceptions to the warrant requirement.
18Morris L. Ernst, The Great Reve sals: Tales of the
SuT)reme Court (new York: '.'!e,.·hri:c:ht

ci71d

'i.'all(;", 1973, r•.

l~l.

l9rn ~atz, a conversation from a telephone booth
.was overheard by the FBI seeking evidence that Katz was transmitting wagering information across state lines. A "bug"
was planted on top of the booth.
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Justice Stewart, writing the Court's opinion, said
that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not· places" and
that the government's eavesdropping "violated the privacy
upon which [defendant] justifiably relied. 1120 Justice Black
was the sole dissenter in Katz.

After reminding the Court

of what he had said in his Griswold dissent, he said:
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the
extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures of· "persons, houses, papers, and effects." No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power
to hold unconstitutional everything which affects
privacy.21
Katz. was not a total ban on unwarranted electronic
surveillance, for it had made the exceptions for "national
security" reasons and other specified areas.

However, after

Katz secured the warrant restraint on electronic eavesdropping, Congress acted at once to·broaden the scope of
eavesdropping by enacting the "Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968."

In Title III, "Wiretapping and

Electronic Surveillance," permission was granted for courtapproved interceptions by federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials in investigating a large number of
crimes, and authority was given to the President to take
measures he deemed necessary to safeguard the security of
the nation.

The Omnibus Act was an indication that the con-

cern over "the plethora of problems riding a rising crime
wave was echoed by the emergence of 'law and order'
crucial political priority."
?Q

~

.

389 U.S. 347, J)O.
21 Ibid. , 373.

~s

a

The public was obviously "sold
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on the need for new laws allowing police investigatory

forces to use electronic surveillance, 1122
The Court, however, qualified the "national securi ty" exceptions of Katz in United S_tates v. U. S, District.
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), where the federal government
had engaged in the unwarranted electronic surveillance of
dissident political groups under a veil of "national domestic security."

The government attempted to use in its pro-

secution of dissidents the results of its wiretapping as
evidence of identity.

The Court in an 8-0 decision, held

that even in the interest of domestic security, Fourth Amendment qualifications must be observed and that electronic
surveillance is an impermissible investigative method unless
judicially authorized by a warrant.

The Court was confronted

here with the issues of the power of the President, through
his Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance.
The Government's reliance on the Omnibus Act of 1968 was
held by the Court to be without merit.

There are two very

significant facts about the Court's decision: "the government's attempts to revitalize the general warrant in the
guise of national security has been decisively thwarted, 112 3
and there is a "thread of privacy running through this case
22Edward J. Gallagher and Robert M. Hollis, "Federal Decisions on the Constitutionality of Electronic Surveillance Le~islation," The American Criminal Law Review 11
(Spring 1973): 655. The legislative history of th~ Omnibus
Act is found in Richard Harris, "Annals of Legislation-- the
Turning Point," The New Yorker, 14 December 1968, p. 68.
2
3Alan 7'eisel, "~-o~:::s:-c2- :ur-rei2.~2.::,ce :i.~d :r:2 ?::n:.:-"::-:
Amendment," University of l-'i0tsburgh Law Heview JS (?all

1973): 70.
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vital to the formulation of a possible new standard. 1124
Such a standard for "upgrading of individual protection may not be forthcoming through traditional means 112 5
of the Fourth Amendment.

It is vital that the. constitutional

right to privacy be more explicitly recognized in the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees, as Justice Louis Brandeis urged
long ago in his Olmstead dissent, and that law enforcers become more personally sensitive to the threats to individual
and group privacy. 26 In the wake of the United States District
Court opinion, one court observer wrote very appropriately:
In the final analysis, therefore, the application of
the warrant requirement to political surveillance-as in all other forms of search and seizure for which
it is required--necessitates the same kind of voluntary and good faith compliance by government~l officials with constitutionally sanctioned procedures
as do all other instances of the implementation of
fundamental rights of the individual. Sadly, the events
of recent years and months indicate the paucity of
bona fides among our elected officials and their appointed assistants.27
The prohibition of searches or surveillance without
court order is becoming increasingly significant to the twin
policy

objectiv~s

of preserving morality of government and

24Richard A. Goren, "The Trumpet of Technology Calls
for a New Constitutional Tune--Constitutional Contours of
Pre-arrest Procurement of Physical Evidence of Identity,"
Suffolk University Law Review 7 (Summer 1973): 1025.
25Ibid., p. 1030.
26For example, it has even been suggested that police
helicopter surveillance should be limited so as not to constitute an "invasion of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life." See Amy Shiner, "Police Helicopter Surveillance," Arizona Law Review 15 (1973): 145.
27F:!eisel, "Political Surveillance," pp. 70-1. Reference is here implied to the break-ins, durin~ President
Nixon's re-election ca~~~i~~ in 1072, of the ~e~oc~at~c :a~tY
Headquarters in the ~atergate, into the office of Dr. Louis
Fielding, psychologist for the "Pentagon Papers" defendant,
Daniel Ellsberg, and other "dirtv tricks" associated with the
Nixon Administration which proceeded without judicial supervision.

o~

preserving the privacy of the individual. .. 28 The Fourth Amendment's right to privacy is, in Justice

Douglas~

words, not

"self-executing," but is "only secure when its prohibitions
are respected by law enforcement officers and enforced by
the courts. 1129
Associational Privacy
In another area of personal secrecy, the Court since
Griswold has reaffirmed its position concerning the importance of the privacy of association.

(In NAACP v. Alabama,

the Court had found a "vital relationship between freedom
to associate and privacy in one's associations."

Though

freedom to engage in association is not a specifically enumerated right, it was nonetheless held to be "an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces freedom of speech."30)
DeGregorv v. New Hampshire Attorney, 383 U.S. 825 (1966), like
the cases Sweezv and Uphaus of the late 1950s,3 1 arose out of
a New Hampshire subversive activities investigation.

The de-

fendant had refused to answer questions about his Communist
activities prior to 1957.

The Court reversed the contempt

conviction, Justice Douglas writing that there was "no showing of 'overriding and compelling state interest' that would
warrant intrusion into the realm of political and associational

28 Robert B. McKay, "Self-Incrimination and the New
Privacy," in The 1967 Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B. Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 212.
2 9William O. Douglas, The Right of the People (Garden
Cit~r, N.~.: Doubledayan'iCo., -:-::.8., ios 0 ) , p. lSl.
J0357 U.S. 449, 460, 462 (1958).
3 1see above, pp. 23-4.

.
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privacy protected by the First Amendment, 11 32
Some strong arguments have been made in recent
years for the recognition of associational privacy, not
only in the area of

~olitical

activities of groups, but

also in their social activities.

One proponent of this

broader right of associational privacy says that "the
right to select one's intimate associates free of governmental compulsion, whether based upon the Griswold 'zone
of privacy,• the Ninth Amendment, or 'traditional' notions
of substantive due process, is 'fundamental.'"

This right,

however, would be "limited by its very nature to the most
personal social relationships."33
The Court has not ruled decisively on this question, but in a restauranteur-sit-in case, Bell v. Mfi.ryla.nfu..
J78 U.S. 226 (1964), Justices William Douglas and Arthur
Goldberg in concurring statements, distinguished between
unconstitutional denial of services in an establishment
open to the public, and private social relationships. Justice Goldberg said:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of
every person to close his home or club to any
person or to choose his social intimates and
business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudice including· race. These and other
rights pertaining to privacy and private association
are th~mselves constitutionally protected liberties.34
The question of the right to freely select one's

.

intimate associates and congregate in private clubs may yet
)?

.

.... 3q3 U.S. ~25.
JJMarc Rohr, "Associational Privacy and the Private
Club: The Constitutional Conflict," Harvard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Law Review 5 (April 1970): 466.
34 378 U.S. 226, 313.
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be directly dealt with by the Court.

A recent case in-

volving a private club's refusal to serve a black man was
decided by the Court without reaching the privacy question.
In Moose lodge No. 107 v, Irvis, 1W7 U.S. 16J (1972), the
Court reversed the lower court's decision requiring the
state, as liquor licensor of the club, to take action to
remedy racial discrimination by the club.

The Court ruled

that the private club's action was not state action.35
Privacy of the Home
Although in the areas of "personal secrecy in the
home and possessions" discussed thus far, the Court's decisions have not significantly reflected the impact of Griswold, the Court has nevertheless recognized a new aspect
of the personal secrecy area, thereby giving a new significance to the right to privacy.

This new aspect was de-

fined in an unusual case, Stanley v.

Geo~,

394 u.s. 557

(1969), as the "right to read or observe what [on~ pleases •..
in the privacy of (the] home. ,.3 6 However, the facts of the
case and the underpinnings of the new right make Stanley
relatively as difficult to interpret as was Griswold.

For

that reason, among others, it shows great potential for
generating litigation covering a broad range of claims to
personal activities in the home, and indeed has already
done so.
J5see "Discrimination in Private Social Clubs:
Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy, " Du]<,,g_b3::'.1_}_qur-

n-:tl (Jccc~ber 1970): llr::l-22~, :'or '.'. r1i::oc·1:::sio:r1 o_' -t.:'.: >:.~
ance that must be kept between associational privacy and state

attempts to promote social, economic, and political equality.
3 6394 u.s. 541, 564.

72
Although the appellant Stanley had been convicted

of possession of obscene materials, his home had initially
been legally entered and searched for evidence of bookmaking.

While finding little evidence of that activity,

federal and state agents did find three rolls of eightmillimeter film in a desk drawer in an upstairs bedroom.
The state officer concluded, after viewing the film with
a projector and screen also found in the bedroom, that they
were obscene, and seized them.
Because of the seizure of materials for which the
original warrant was not granted, -the Court might have
characterized the case as a search and

seiz~re

problem like

MaPJ2; or because of the content of the materials involved,
I.

it could have characterized it as an obscenity case like
Roth v. U,S., J54 U.S. 476 (195?); or still another ground
could have been the privacy right as in Griswold.
Court chose the last alternative. 2 7

The

Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court,
said that mere private possession of any materials, whether
obscene or not, was constitutionally protected because there

is a fundamental "right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
one's privacy ... 38 The Court was not concerned with the ordinary Fourth Amendment grounds concerning the technical requirements of a warrant or the "reasonableness" of searches
J7Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White, concurring,
urged reversal on Fourth Amendment ~rounds that an j_lle~al
search ::..n·i seiZu!.""e

::.2.:

~;:~-::c::

~)l:i..ce.

~:-:)::·~.:cc:

jlv..c~:,

t}:~:):~~1

a strict constructionist and foe of privacy, was nevertheless an absolutist in terms of protections afforded by the
First Amendment, and concurred in Stanley, viewing it as
upholding First Amendment guarantees of free expression.

38394

u.s. 557, 564.
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without warrants, nor was it directly concerned with a
determination of what "obscenity" is.
Since the state could not demonstrate a compelling
interest for invading Stanley's private "library" of films
in order to enforce the obscenity statute, the Court could
find no basis for Stanley's conviction and thus held that
private possession of obscene material "is (an1 insufficient
justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties. "39 The Court, in effect, established a First Amendment form of "locus" or "res" test which had been only recently rejected in Katz where the Court had said that the
Constitution "protects people, not places." 40 The Court was
not determining whether the film was constitutionally protected, but whether the state interest in suppressing pornography outweighed the constitutional protection given
to the home.

The Court approved the validity of obscenity

regulation to protect children and unwilling adults from
exposure, but could not justify the validity of these interests when mere private, consensual possession in one's
home was on the balance.

The Court made it clear that its

ruling was intending no general rejection of the Roth doctrine in the distribution or public viewing of obscene materials, nor was it infringing upon the state's power to
regulate "other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or
stolen goods" in the home.

41 ~Y determining that the state's

393~4 U.S. 557, 565.
403g9 u.s. J4'-' J50
I

I

41 394 U.S. 557, 564.

10,.7)
l.~/b,
1

•
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allegation of obscenity was an insufficient justification
for invasion of Stanley's privacy, Stanley "suggests that
the notion of privacy cannot stand alone. 1142 Although Justice Marshall wrote that the decision was not to disturb
Roth's holding that obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment, his opinion, nevertheless, was expressed generally
in First Amendment notions of freedom of expression and
thought: "the right to :ead or observe what [one] pleases ..•
in the privacy of [the] home: 4 J "to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth; 1144 to determine
"the moral content of [his] thoughts; .. 4 5 and "to satisfy
his intellectual and emotional needs. 1146
Legal experts and lower courts as well had problems interpreting Stanley's implications for obscenity,
privacy, and searches and seizures.

Though it had used

First Amendment grounds, as well as privacy grounds, the
Stanley decision is read now, after it has been tested
the lower courts and by the Supreme Court in recent obscenity cases, as purely a privacy case. 47 In a review of

by

4 2Al Katz, "Privacy and Pornography: Stanlev v.
Georgia," in The 1969 Supreme Court Review, ed: Philip B.
Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 210.

43394

u.s.

44 Ibid ..

557, 564.

4 5Ibid., 565.
46 Ibid ..
4 7"0n Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberties," New "ork Universitv Law Review 48 (October
1973): 687. Others have read St,?.nle'r differently, however,
rejecting the "purely private" theory and asserting a "privac~~-n1u~"

th~or"".r ':l~ic!: :::ee:.,.... t'J b:; s~ :--~~
:-:o:~,e car.not ·c(; ::.r.

that -privacy of the

, .. the

~(~::;n,!""'.'"~.i t~

c7:

::;_esolute r.:..:·:;:, ~~:-~-;:
is subject to invasion when the state asserts a subordinating
interest. See "Still ~·:ore Ado About Dirty Books (and Pictures):
Stanlev, Reidel, and TIU-rt'r-Seven Photogranhs," Yale Law
Journal 81 (November 1971): 309-JJ.
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the 1968 Supreme Court term, the Harvard Law Review termed
Stanley's formulation as a clear First Amendment one and
foresaw the task ahead of determining protected as opposed
to unprotected forms of obscenity distribution. 49 The belief that Stanlev represented a dramatic shift in the Court's
view of obscenity regulation was shared by a number of lower
courts.

~etween

1969 and 1972, over fifty obscenity cases

in the lower federal courts alone concerned the scope of the
Stanley decision. 49 For instance, in Karalex5s v. Bvrne, J06
F. Supp. 1J6J (D.

~ass.

1969), the court enjoined the state's

prosecution of a theater owner under Massachusetts' obscenity laws for exhibition of "I Am Curious (Yellow)" in a public theater.5°
No occasion arose for a full treatment of the problems posed by Stanlev until late in the 1970-71 term with
the decisions in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971),
and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. J6J

( 1971).

The Court proceeded fu these cases to "whi ttl (e)

Stanley's holding down to its facts" and exposed the decision
as "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is
his castle. , .. 51 rn Reidel, pornographic booklets had been
mailed in violation of a federal statute.

The Court distin-

guished between the private right to possess pornography expressed in Stanley and the legitimate power of the government to regulate general obscenity:
48
"The Supreme Court, 1968 Term," Harvard Law Review
83 (Hovember 1969): 151-2.
4
9"Still I·.~ore Ado," p. 313, n. J2.
50ibid., p. Jl2.
5l"On Privacy," p. 6g7,
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The focus of this language in Stanfil was on
freedom of mind and thought and on the privacy
of one's home. It does not require that we
. fashion or recognize a constitutional rieht
in people like Reidel to distribute or sell
obscene materials ..• 52
Reidel and Thirtv-Seven Photographs so stringently
limited a person's ability to acquire obscene materials
from outside the home that Justice Black, who had strongly
concurred in the Stanley decision as upholding First Amendment rights of expression and thought, dissented in ThirtySeven Photos saying that now one can exercise his right in
the home only if he "writes salacious books in his attic,
prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living
room. n53
A series of more recent decisions, upholding governmental regulation of public viewing of obscene films, Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973): upholding regulation of the acquisition and importation of obscene materials, United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super qmm. Film
et al., 413 U.S. 12J (197J); and regulation of the transportation of obscene materials in interstate commerce,
United States v. Ori to, 41J U.S. 139 (19?J), have further
clarified the Court's intentions in Stanlev. Chief Justice
Warren E. 3urger, delivering the Court's opinion in Paris,
said the idea that "conduct involving consenting adults
only is alwavs beyond state regulation is a step we are
unable to take."5 4 Burger also made it clear that the state
retains an interest in the

52 402
53402
54413

~oral

u.s. 351, 356.
u.s. 363, 382.
u.s. 49, 68.

content of its citizens'
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thoughts and can restrict that content to protect the morality of society and prevent anti-social conduct.

Further-

more, the Court has shown in the recent case, Miller v,
California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), that obscenity standards may vary throughout the nation, and it has therefore
instructed the courts to apply communit:r standards to obscenity regulation.55
Since the Court erased all of Stanley's First Amendment content, the privacy aspect of the home is the narrow
basis left for the decision.

The emphasis now firmly esta-

blished on simply "being at HOME" implies that one acquires
the right to do things that one cannot do elsewhere.

In

fact, in United States v. Orito, Chief Justice Burger stated
for the Court:

rt is hardly necessary to catalog the myria1
activities that may be lawfully engaged in
within the privacy and confines of the home,
but may be prohibited in public.56
Activities such as smoking marijuana, gambling, and fornication could all be claimed as rights protected by Stanley's "privacy of the home." If Stanley does protect a range
of activities similar in nature to private possession of
obscene materials, then "privacy of
be a potent constitutional right.

th~

home" may prove to

"Stanley must now be

viewed as a supplement to the Fourth Amendment, giving added
protection to the values of seclusion and repose centered
about the ho.me • .. 5? However, to date, the courts have not made

5503 s· ~t· 2~n"
2·~7
v (
56
413 u.s. 139, 142-3.
,,..

•

'J

•

~

J

.,,. r)...:...

I

•

57"on Privacy," p. 754.
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detailed inquiry into what activities may constitutionally
go on in the home.

Statutes regulating various· practices

considered harmful to society have been afforded a presumption of constitutionality,

Yet, at least one member of

the Court has spoken of the potential of Stanley.

Justice

John M. Harlan placed Stanlev among the "(n'J ew 'substantive
due process' rules, that is, those that place ... certain
kinds of primary private individual conduct beyond the power
of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe ... 58
Other facets of Stanley in addition to "privacy of
the home" allude to the possibility of a torrent of litigation.

Stanley spoke of "the right to satisfy (one's] emo-

tional needs 59 and of the statute's "infringement of funda11

mental liberties." 60 These statements could.be extrapolated
into a general doctrine of limitations on state power in
the area of "fundamental liberties to satisfy one's emotional needs," such as private sexual conduct and drug use.
In fact, in the area of marijuana rights, the report of the

National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse has recommended that all criminal sanctions be withdrawn from private
!!§g_

and nossession of marijuana incident to such use, al-

though the production and distribution of the drug would
.
. .
1 ac t'1v1. t.1es.
remain
cr1m1na

61 H
owever, a very recen t

eva 1 ua-

tion of the Stanley-Paris impact on drug laws observes that

58 Justice Harlan, concurring and dissenting in ~cKav
v. u.s., 401 u.s. 667, 692 (1971).
59394 u.s. 55 7 , 565.
GOibid., 564.
61 Reported in N.Y. Times, ~arch 23, 1972, sect. 1, p.
19, col. 1, and referred to in "Still i/Iore Ado, " p. 333.
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" ••• the courts have been indifferent to arguments based

on the right to privacy ..•• "

The article concludes that

the nation's courts are not likely to extend the liberties
of drug users since Paris held that even though "some human
'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be incidentally affected,
this does not bar the State from acting to protect legitimate state interest. 1162
Solitude and Autonomy,
Involving Personal Intimacies and Decisions
Griswold announced the existence of a constitutional
zone of privacy, but "it did little to sketch the perimeters of that zone." 6 3 The case had a combination of elements which lower courts and various justices on the Supreme
Court have interpreted in different ways.

Griswold involved

a place, the home, which either because of the sanctity of
the activity involved or the sanctity of the home itself,
might invoke constitutional protection.

The general area

of secrecy in the home and personal possessions has shown
relatively little success, except for Stanley's narrow
holding, in invoking stricter constitutional protection,
The Fourth Amendment exceptions to the home's privacy, the
.
.
warrant and "reasonable" entry, in addition to qualifications made by the Court as to what is "reasonable" and.what (
is "trespass," have functioned thus far to make the privacy\
of the home and possessions easily invaded upon a showing

,.,l~r..._... "c~
:,.,..,,,..,.~ a;,.;d C:: :t.i '::lertv," 'I'.1e
- ... --v.·='"'-'
Civil Liberties Review 1 (Winter/Spring 19'14): 124.
6J"on Privacy," p. 687,
62 -_iero·f D

•
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of a compelling state interest. Privacy in this area since

Griswold is, althougb a "fundamental" interest, nevertheless,
non-absolute.
Since Griswold, however, another area of privacy
which has become more conducive to invoking constitutional
protection involves solitude in personal intimacies and autonomy in personal decision-making.

Regardless of whether

the Court further develops the Stanlev-Paris notion of a
protected locus, the Court has indeed made it clear that it
will protect, apart from any locus test,~ertain fundamental privacy interests surrounding the solitude of human
intimacies and the autonomy of personal decision-making
relating to the course of a person's life)
Marital and Familial Decisions
The specific holding in Griswold that the "right of
marital privacy" was a fundamental and constitutional right
is now seen as part of a "rational continuum," in the words
of Justice Harlan, of decisions protecting marriage, procreation, and family rights as a fundamental '!liberty"
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The key cases in

the early part of that "continuum" were Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (192J), in which the Court asserted that the
·"right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children"
is a part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment; ." 64 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 ( 1942), in

64

262

u.s. 390, 399.
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which the Court held that compulsory sterilization of habi-

tual criminals was a violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a denial of "one of the basic
civil rights of man" and that "fm)arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the survival of the race: 116 5 and Pierce
v.

Soci~ty

o:f Siste?;g, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the

Court extended Fourteenth Amendment protection to the "li.berty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their contro1. 1166
Although

Skinn~

may be distinguishable as an equal

protection case, and Neyer as a first amendment case, the
characterization of family and procreation as "fundamental
liberties" was a pertinent precedent for the Griswold holding
and later decisions.

It is suggested, furthermore, that

Griswold marked a return to notions of substantive due process in areas relating to personal liberty. 67 Continuing
to develop this protection of the intimate relationship of
marriage, the Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
affirmed a constitutional right to marry across the color
lines, terming marriage again as one of the "basic civil
rights of man," and held that "to deny this fundamental freedom •.• is surely to deprive .•• citizens of liberty without
due process of law."

68

.

Although "privacy" was not mentioned,

the Court made a more fundamental determination of marriage

65316 u.s. 535, 541.
66 268

u.s.

510, 543-5,
6 7· :::iee
~
G-era~, d 0untr.e!.'
.,
..
. . 1 _,o·;i
n
i ir:.G,
·
r._,as es 2,r:c..
2.r..a. .·.oe
rr:aterials on Individual RigbJ;s in Constitutional Law, 8th
ed. (hlineola, N.Y.: Foundation ?ress Inc., 1970), p. 838.
68 388 u.s. 1, 12.
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and family rights through substantive due process language.
The Court did this again in Levv v, Louisiana, J91 U.S. 68

(1968), where it held that a Louisiana statute denying a
right of recovery by illegitimate children upon the death

of their mother was discrimination contravening the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that
the "rights asserted ... involve the intimate familial
relationship between a child and his mother. 116 9
The development of a zone of privacy protection
around marriage and the family has thus far been viewed
by the Court as a "traditional" zone.

Although the Court

has not dealt directly with rights to homosexual marriage
or homosexual cohabitation without marriage, it recently
confronted the right to adopt a non-traditional lifestyle, that is, communal living.
v. Boraas, 94

s.

In Village of Belle Terre

Ct. 15J6 (1974), a local zoning ordinance

was challenged.which ban?Bi communal living by restricting
land use to one-family dwellings occupied by "traditional"
family units or groups of not more than two unrelated persons.

Action was brought to have the ordinance declared

an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause
and the rights of privacy, association, and travel.

The

Court voted 7-2 to sustain the right of localities to write
zoning laws banning communal living in family residential
areas.
Surprisingly, since the claim of right of privacy
had been asse!'ted, Justice Souglas •::as on the side of the

69 391 U.S. 68, 71.
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majority and wrote the Court's opinion.

He wrote that

states are entitled to make that kind of economic and social
judgment and enforce it with zoning laws.

Justice Marshall

took up the banner of right to privacy, nonetheless, and
asserted that appellee's constitutional right to privacy
had been violated by an ordinance unnecessarily burdening
the First Amendment right to association.

He also urged

that the Court recognize that Griswold guaranteed the right
to "establish a home" as an essential part of the "liberty"
of the Fourteenth Amendment.70
Yet in a case concerning a federal regulation of a
non-traditional household, the Court took an opposite view,
In Department of Agriculture v.

~oreno,

413 U.S. 528 (1973),

I

the Court affirmed the judgment of a three-judge district
court that held as violative of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment an amendment to the Federal Food Stamp
Act which limited distribution of food stamps to households
comprised of related persons.

In this case, Justice Douglas

concurred, observing that the provision "has an impact on
the rights of people to associate."7l The strikingly different views of the Court in these cases either leads us
to hypothesize that the Court has been inconsistent in the
area of non-traditional living or that only where the government interest in regulating non-traditional living is deemed
insufficient by the Court, would the right of persous to live
in non-traditional settings be constitutionally protected.
7094 S. Ct. 1536, 1544.
7l41J U.S. 528, 544.
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Since Levy had held that the "illegitimate family" had equal
rights to a "legitimate family," the latter hypothesis may
be the answer. 72
The Decision to Conceive
As Griswold, Skinner, and NAACP have demonstrated,
the Court has indicated a continuing unwillinr,ness to be
bound by the specific terms of the Bill of Rights in defending fundamental liberties.73 Since the Griswold decision, Loving, J&.yy, and Deuartment of Agriculture have used
the fundamental rights approach to strike down statutes
that violated the freedom to marry and the freedom of the
"illegitimate" and "untraditional" family.

Since the fun-

damental rights-due process approach "potentially allows
courts so much discretion, judges .•• must take care to
set self-imposed limits in the form of reasoned and clear
statements of the interests that are being protected. 7 4
11

Thus, when the courts confront governmental invasion into private intimacies and decision-making, the question is
whether the state's interest in the protection of public
morality, health, or whatever, can justify the invasion.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 4J8 (1972), suggests
that important freedoms cannot be curtailed without a sub7 2see Jonathan Shor, "All in the 'Family: ' Legal
Problems of Communes," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
Law Review 7 {rv!arch 1972): 39J-4Jl.
73Griswold v. Connecticut, Jl'.31. U.S. 479 ( 1965):
penumbral theory of privacy and Fourteenth Amendment: Skinner
v. Oklahor.la, 316 U.S. 535 (1942): equc.l nrotectio~ cls.'..ls:::~
+~a

?ourteenth

Ame~d~e~~

~recludcj

abri~:-~ent
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~~e

f~~da

mental right of procreation; hAACP_y~abama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958): First and Fourteenth Amendments protected the "privacy
of association."
74 "Recent Cases," Harvard Law Review 84 (April 1971):
15JO. ·
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stantial countervailing interest. Eisenstadt involved a

Massachusetts statute which forbad the distribution of contraceptive devices to anyone but a married person.

In a

6-1 decision (Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H,
Rehnquist did not participate), the Court held that, in
allowing the distribution of contraceptives by physicians
to married persons while prohibiting distribution to the
unmarried, the statute employed a classification that
was not ratio.nally related to a valid public purpose and
therefore violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Somewhat out of context, however,

the Court observed:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
. right of the individual, married or single, to ·
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.75
It is noteworthy that Justice Potter Stewart
joined the majority opinion in Eisenstadt, since he had
dissented in Griswold.

However, it may have been that

Eisenstadt "strain(ed) for grounds of invalidation which
would avoid the Griswold ..• issue.

Direct confrontation

of that issue would certainly have been controversial.
Moreover, Justice William Brennan probably would have lost
Justice ·stewart 's support if he had sought to extend Griswold directly. ,,7·6 Also, it has been hypothesized that with
the abortion cases due to be heard in that term, the Court

75405
6 .. U.S. 433, 453,

7 Gerald Gunther, "Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection," Harvard law Review 86 (November 1972): 34.

R6
did not wish to·jeopardize its options by giving a Gri.§.wold right to privacy interpretation to this decision. 77
However,··in retrospect, the real importance of the decision.is
the revelation that the Court was as cognizant
as evervone else that the rationale of Griswold
was not dependent on the privacy of the marital
relationship, but rather on the privilege to
engage in sexual intercourse with reasonable
certainty of avoiding the possible consequences
of pregnancy. If, as Chief Justice Burger said
in his solo dissent, this smacks of substantive
due process, it will not deter the Court from its
conclusion, so long as it doesn't impose such
a label on its res~lt.78
Eisenstadt also suggests, though not explicitly
st~tirig

it, "that Griswold should not be read too narrowly,"

.In the line of the Skinner, NAACP, Stal)ley, Griswold, and
Loving decisions, Eisenstadt again "reaffirms the Court's
support for unspecified rights."

It also "suggests that

a·decision as to when a state must bear the extraordinary
burden of justification for intruding into a personal decision must refer to how fundamentally the activity in
question affects the individual."79
The Decision to Bear or Abort
Although Eisenstadt had only tentatively in dictum
upheld a right to privacy through the Griswold decision,
the. words were there

\~hi ch

defined ·privacy as the "right

of the individual" and as a right involving freedom from
.

.

. ·· 7711 The Supreme Court, 1971 Term," Harvard Law Review
86 (November
1972):
122.
Q
.
.
.
7 ~Philip 3. ~:urland, "1971 Term: The '.:"ear of the
Stewart- 1:/hi te Court," in The 1972 Supreme Court Review, ed:
Philip 3. Kurland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973)' p.' 248 •.
79 It On J;>ri vacy, " p. 697.
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"unwarranted ..• intrusion into .•. the decision whether
to bear or beget a child." 80 Eisenstadt had not, however,
displayed a judicial cohesiveness concerning the Griswold
right of privacy since Chief Justice Burger had dissented;
Justices Douglas and Byron White, the latter joined by
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, wrote concurring opinions;
Justice Stewart joined the majority opinion, probablv
because it did not rely on Griswold; and the two newest
Justices, Powell and Rehnquist, did not participate.
The abortion cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and Doe v. 3olton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which the Court
decided in its 1972 term, however, "indicated a judicial
cohesiveness " 81 and "elevated [the EisenstadtJ dictum to
a constitutional mandate." 82 Several of the justices joined
in grounding the independent right of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of "liberty" and in including
within that right the right to decide on abortion.
curring were Burger and

Po~ell,

Con-

supposedly appointed to

provide a greater conservative balance on the Court.

Jus-

tice Rehnquist dissented, saying that the Court was in
effect returning to substantive due process philosophy.
In Wade, the district court had ruled that the
right of single and married persons to choose whether to
have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment through
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the statute was uncon-

80405

u.s.

438, 453.

81u
1
o·
. l
,.are'!
,,iede_,

.. -.

.:.-rer::nco.n2'.r,

";).

~rivac•r,

anrl

~'.°'1-?

Co:".2-:-.:.-

tution: The Court at the Crossroads," University of ~lorida
Law Review 25 (Summer 1973): 7s:n.
8211Applicatiori of the Constitutional Privacy Right,"
p. 1042.

stitutionally vague.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the lower

court's decision, but preferred to base the right to privacy on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than on the Ninth.
The right to abortion, however, is not absolute,
according to the Wade opinion, because
it is reasonable and appropriate for a state
to decide that at some point in time another
interest, that of health of the mother or that
of potential human life becomes significantly
involved. The woman's privacy is no loneer
sole and any right of privacy she possesses
must be measured accordingly.BJ
The Court for the first time, however, expressly held that
infringements upon the right to privacy must be justified
by a "compelling state interest."

Before the point that

·:the fetus is "viable"--that is, before the end of the
!

"first trimester.:.-the mother's protected right to privacy
must be considered the dominant interest. 84
Though·the Court, through Justice Blackmun, delivered
its principle decision in Wade, the companion case, Bolton,
followed that ruling.

Whereas Wade challenged the validity

of a Texas statute prohibiting abortion except.when necessary to save the mother's life, Bolton challenged certain
restrictive provisions of the Georgia abortion statute.
D~claratory

_:·that the

judgments and injunctions were sought on grounds

~tatutes

abridged the woman's right of personal

privacy protected.by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
;. . ·Fourteenth

..

-'·

~.mendments.

In Bolton, the Court held unconsti-

89
'
tutional also the provision of the Georgia
statute that

prohibited abortions before the ending of the first tri~ester and.struck down other requirements of residency,
~ospit~i-'accreditation, hospital committee approval, and
concurrence of two other physicians. 8 5

Some significant concurring thoughts in Wade
that perhaps make the rationale of the Griswold, Wade, and
Bolton decisions clearer were those of Justice Stewart,
who had strongly dissented, along with Justice Black, in
Griswold, and yet had concurred in Eisenstadt .
••• it was clear to me then, and it is equally
clear to me-now, that the Griswold decision can
be'rationally understood only as a holding that
the Connecticut statute substantively invaded
the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ...• As
so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long
line of cases decided under the doctrine of
substantive due process, and I now accept it
.as such .•.. The Constitution nowhere mentions
a specific right of personal choice in matters
,of marriage and family life, but the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights ....
Clearly, therefore, the Court today is correct
in holding that the right asserted by Jane Roe
is .embraced.within the personal liberty pro'tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ~·86

I•

One.,observer of the 1972 term said that in Wade
and Bolton, ''when. the. Cour.t. had its most dramatic opportunity_ to express its supposed aversion to substantive
•

due process, it carrie_d

,t

~hat

:

'

doctrine to lengths few

5Justices White a~d Rehnquist, who had dissented
.in Wade, dissented aF:ain in ~oJ_to!'l, art!:uir:g that thg a1!or.tion issue~~hould.be left to the political processes of ~he
·,:_state·.
86".
. . ·. '
·

'.

..

··.,

8

410.u.s. 113, 167-70.
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observers had expected .••• "·· In fact, this same observer
riotes ·that Justice Rehnquist ·agrees in his dissent that
the "liberty" protected by Fourteenth Amendment due proc~s~

"embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of

Rights," and Justice White would find abortions constitutionally protected when required to avoid "substantial
hazards to either life or health."

Therefore, the Court

could be "considered unanimous in accepting a fairly
sweeping concept of substantive due process, although
various justices continue to resist that characterization. 1187
..
In summary, the Court decided that the abortion
decision was a right of the individual that the government could not abridge during the first trimester, since
the woman's health was not at issue.
choosing simply between abortion ,mu:
.pregnancy.

The Court was not
~

and continued

It was not making a moral or religious deter-

mination.

"It was instead choosing among alternative allo-

• /... ~· J

"

cations of decision-making authority ..•. 1188 It decided
that it was the role of the woman to make such a personal·-, .. decision, rather than an agency of the government.
It was also the role of her doctor, and not the government, to make the decision after the first trimester. The
'

•

·~ ~

i

.

•

•

~

·,.:

:

Court was not, in other words, .saying whether abortion is
'

moral~y.right.or

wrong.- It did not consider the question.

Instead, ·i~ d~cided that the question of abortion was
within the ·~role .of the individual to decide for herself.
: 37.... . .
.. ' . .
.,. ,
~
.
-.
.· .Laurence~. l'r1ae, "~ore 1.•iord: J.owara a .•.odel of
c''· Roles iri the. Due Process of Life and Law, " HC!-rvard Law
··,Review '37 (November 1973): 2.
88 .. ,'.
: Ibid., p. 11.
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Whether or not the Court· recognized that it was involved
in role-allocation in the abortion decisions,
:it seems .clear that in seeking to weigh only
the benefits and detriments of early abortion
as such, the Court limited and clouded the horizon of its inquiry by collapsing the considerations bearing on the Abortion Decision Cwhich
would involve an emotional and religious entanglement of the state in determining the
sanctity of life and the rights of the fetus
as a person) into those involved in the abortion decision [which required only that the
·court transfer the role of decision-;.fJAker from
the gove~nment to the woman herself J "99
The significance of Wade and Bolton was that they
reached beyond the marital relationship identified in
Griswold by extending the right to choose abortion to
the woman herself, married or unmarried.

Of course, Eisen-

stadt had already made the extension of the choice to beget
'

'

: to the unmarried woman.

But the abortion cases also ex-

tended the Griswold right to include the decision to bear

or

abort. The abortion decisions, therefore, were an in-

cremental development in constitutional doctrine in the
line of decislons from·~eyer through Eisenstadt. 90
.When cases came before the Court in which public
school teachers had been forced to resign after they had
decided to bear, the Wade decision was obviously a determining' influence on the Court's decision.

In Cleveland

.

Board of Education v. LaFleur and Cohen v. Chesterfield

~ 89Ibld ~ ,

51-2. :

.
.90See, however,
the argument that Wad~_was not an
incremental development, but a "quantum jump" in Philip B.
' Hevmann and ~Dou.glas E. 3arze1a~r, "The ?o!"est cu:.r1 the fT1re?s:
··Roe v .. ',·[g_de a~d 2"ts Crit:cs," Bo::: ton Unive!"sit·.' ls:.'I Re·,'ie·.·1
. 53. (July l973):. 777, n. 61. See also the argument that 'l'ia.Qg
is· "bad· constitutional law" and is no part of the "privacy"
interest_ the Bill of Rights suggests, in John Hart Ely, "The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 'dade," Yale Law
Journal 82 \April 1973): 920-49.
- - ----

.92

·co. School Board, 94

s. Ct. 791 (1974), the Court invali-

dated the maternity leave regulations in upholding a freed.om ·Of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
li_fe as a "liberty" protected by. the due process clause.
Unconventional Sexual Conduct
·The abortion decisions have also indicated that
the Court is not adverse to using broad powers where neces. sary to protect ·fundamental privacy interests.

This ex-

pansive use of judicial discretion was obvious in the
Cleveland-Cohen cases, but has great potential in other
areas of sexual conduct--those specifically considered
"anti-social," "immoral," or "non-traditional" by society.
If the Court follows the course of determining whether the
state's interest in the protection of public morality or
health justifies moral legislation or regulation, as it

did in

Vill~ge

of Belle

Terr~,

then non-traditional living

arrangements may be subject to close scrutiny since they
'

.

involve "public" interests',

Howeve~te

in-

terests, which involve the StanJ.,gy. right to privacy in
"

the h~me ,---;~hasnomosexuali ty, extra~mari tal .relations,
sod.omv •. a~d adui tery~--tlre-s-tate 's Interest may not be -deermea-·compelling. enough to--justifyinvasfon of--=fnos-e--pri-----;·

~-te---intimacies .------.---·

.· The cons ti tutionali ty of a public employer's right
to require employees to comply with moral codes is one area
where the. ~ncertainty of the right to .privacy is evident. 91
.
.
------------- ---------

.

· P•·
,

. -~ .

--.

1062~

'

.·,

.,•

9111 Application of the Constitutional Privacy Right,"

.

.
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One; reason that it has been difficult for a determination

to be' made by courts in the area of moral· conduct laws,
whether pertaining to public employees or citizens in
general, is that courts are seldom faced with litigation
involving private sexual behavior.

Private, consensual

sexual behavior is rarely prosecuted, and when charges
are brought, they are generally in addition to charges of
criminal activities for which authorities initially invaded the citizen's privacy.
Two recent district court cases, however, have
given perceptive discussion of the right to privacy as
applied to private sexual behavior.

In Acanfora v. Board

of Education, 359 F. Supp. t343 (D. Md., '1973), a homosexual
!

school teacher had been involuntarily transferred and eventually dismissed from employment.

The district court, in

'

applying the rulings of Griswold and Wade, held for the
first time that private consenting homosexuality is explicitly included within the zones of interests protected by
the constitutional right to privacy.

In Lovisi v. Slavton,

363 F. Supp •. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), the Court was faced with
a challenge to the conviction of a married couple and a
third party for sodomy under Virginia law.

Prosecution

was precipitated when photographs taken by the partici'

-~

pants in.the acts came into the possession of authorities .
. '

The district judge accepted Wade's "candid approach:' to
substantive due process and declared that the due process
clause
,

protect~

fundacental human values

''i~plicit

in the

;

( .. concept of.ordered liberty."

Since the broad Virginia

~·;
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sodomy law would apply to private, marital acts, the court
.
,
..
found that the law "doubtless threatens an invasion of the
'

~

right of privacy."

The court concluded that the marital-

non-marital distinction was no longer viabfe after Eisenstadt and therfore, the sodomy law could not be constitutionally applied.to any private, consensual sexual behavior.92
By broadening the definition of the right of privacy beyond previous limits, Wade does seem to mean that
a wide variety of morality statutes abridge the privacy
right.

However, the Wade opinion can be seen to distin-

guish abortion laws from other morality laws since it indicates that abortion laws were not fully established in the
legal tradition of state regulatirin of personal matters.93
Regulations of moral conduct, however, may "form a pattern
.so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life
that any constitutional doctrine in this area must build
upon that basis. 1194 Wade, therefore, "leaves open the possibility that such laws may be entitled to more respect and
less severe scrutiny ... if they reflect the predominant
. '

1·.~-

~o ra l view of society."95

92 363 F. S~pp. 620, 624-5.· The judge in Lovisi, ulti-

mately held that since petitioners had carelessly treated the
"photographs of the acts, they forfeited an;r constitutional
. ,protection and were therefore without standing to challenge
''the law on privacy grounds. 363 F. Supp. 620, 629.
'
: = ~-~3410 u.s. llJ, 132-46.
.. .
:· 94 Justice Harlan, concurring,· in Poe v. Ullman, 367
' u:s.
•
• . ·407
,,,
t·.· <46 ·(19h1)
..,I

-

,,. --

•

- . a~

,., .. , ..... .:'.:-'"The Supreme Court, 1972 Term," [iarvard law Review

· 87 (November 197J): 84-5.

···'""
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Physical Integrity and Other Autonomous Conduct
From the

rig~1t

to autonomy in the abortion deci-

sion announced in Wade, one might draw a right to "inviol~bility

of the body" and "physical integrity."

However,

Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Wade, did say
that the Court was not clear as to whether the claim that
"one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases 1196 is related to the right of privacy articulated
in Wade or in previous decisions.

Thus, the question now

is not "from whence did the right of privacy come?" but
"where is it going and what are its bounds?"

In Oliff v.

East Side Union High School District, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972),
cert.
-

denied, the
. Court refused to hear the complaint
•raised against a school board's regulation of students'
hairstyles as a violation of the First Amendment's guarantees of· freedom of expression.

Although not addressing

the First Amendment claim, Justice Douglas, dissenting, said
that although" ••• 'liberty' is not defined in the Constitution •.. as.we held in Griswold •.. it includes at least
the fundamental rights 'retained by the people' under the
Ninth Amendment."97
.•··.. The use of marijuana and other soft drugs may also
be connected with other private rights involving autonomous conduct that does not affect others.

To date, de-

tailed:inquiry into this area has not been made by the courts,
and statutes are presumed to

ce constitutional. 9g However,

§'".

9 6410 u.s. llJ, 154 .
._. 974'04
1042, 1044.
·---98 .
..'. ... "On Privacy, " p. 7 55.

u.s.
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it is important to note·
that - decisions such as Gris·Nold, Stan.,

lfill., Eisenstadt, and Wade, which have gone beyond the first
"eight amendments in defining new riehts through the concept
of "liberty," have opened the door for the Court to develop
other unenumerated rights.
Analysis of the Q.bi.fil[Q)Q Precedent Value
and Radiating Effects
Before making conclusions concerning the status
of the privacy right and discussing one final area of privacy which has not been adequately .dealt with by the Court-government gathering and use of personal information--a
supplementary analysis will be made of the post-Griswold
decisions.

Although a prediction of what the Burger Court's

;legac·y will be with regard to the privacy right is too soon
at this stage, there have been, as the previous analysis
indicates, a substantial number of indications of where the
Griswold right stands now.

Especially since Wade, the scope

of "marital privacy" is at least recognizable.

But Stanley

and Katz also give valid indications of the total scope of
the constitutional privacy right at the present time.

By

looking at the crucial and dramatic decisions of the Court
since Griswold, the -future of the privacy doctrine cannot
be. positively determined, of course.
th~s

But the analysis in

chapter of the important privacy cases does show the

overall influence of the right to privacy doctrine on subsequent .cases to

~ave

been substantial.

The precedent value

of .the actual legal point involved in Griswold, the "penum'

.,

bral""derivation of a right to privacy, can be determined in

97
order to see its effect on subsequent cases of the Supreme
Court and other federal courts.

Through the use of Shepard's

Citations9 9 which comprehensively lists later citations of
cases and classifies them by the legal point involved or
precedent value, this determination can be made.

Since

Shepard's lists state court cases also, but does not classify them, the analysis here will be limited to the Supreme
Court and other federal courts.
CITATIONS OF GRISWOLD 3Y THE COURTS
Supreme
Court

Other
Federal
Courts

Total

Controlling, Followed •.•.

0

8

8

Distinguished••••••.•••••·
·Limited ....•..••.•.......
'
! 'Explained ••••• ~ ••••••....
Harmonized .••••••••.•••..
In Dissenting Opinion .••.
Sample Cite .••••••••.•..•
Total .......•... , .....

1

24

25

0

1

1

1

14
1
24
47

15

0

27
18

119

1

51
65

166

From.this chart it is apparent that the majority,
or 27 out of the 47 citations made of Griswold by the Supreme Court since 1965 have been in dissenting opinions.
A check of those cases revealed also that 8 of those were

.in dissenting opinions of Justice Black, where he was referring to his dissent in Griswold.

The 20 other citations

,
~ ,99shenard's United States Citations, Case Edition
1943-19?1, vol. J (5th erl.., Co~orado Sprinr;s: Shcn3.rd 's
r~~ 0 :J
~a·1-~io~
~u~
1
e~+
C 1·~.... a ti"ons ' Tnc
-· ., lG?l)·
,1
•
~~
u_ •. ._)
.,u_er::._
.... , l07l-lG7~.
. - .... 1,
Case Edi tton, vol. 73 (January 1974); "Advance Sheet·~ part
!·(February 1974).
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\vere. -two references to Griswold in Wade (one by the Court,

_ distinguishing Griswold from .'/ade, and the othe·r in Justice
1

'

.Stewart's concurring opinion, explaining the Griswold case)
and 18 sample citations of Griswold, where the case, decision,
or any of the opinions were simply mentioned or referred to.
In the case of the other federal courts, the precedent value of Griswold improves, with 8 cases citing it
as being the controlling factor, while in 40 other cases
Griswold was more than sample cited, but was distinguished,
limited, explained, or harmonized.

Its appearance in dis-

senting opinions of federal judges occurred 24 times, even
less than in the Supreme Court.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis
is that the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
been slow to base decisions explicitly on the Gris0old right
·to privacy.

The Supreme Court has not cited Griswold as pre-

cedent, and the federal courts have a per-year-average of
little over one citation of Griswold as precedent value.
However, just as the foregoing discussion of the influence
of Griswold was shown to have been more dramatic, so the radiating effect of Griswold has obviously also been.strong
since the federal courts have, in some· way, cited Griswold
, on ..the average of 13. 2 times per year.
With Wade, where the Court with greater unanimity.
based the· right to abortion on the due process clause, the
C,ourt_has obviously determined that the right to privacy is
_implicit in the co:-icep-:; o: "order::d

libert~:"

rather "than in

. - the "penumbras" of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.

·~hough
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the Griswold penumbral rieht to privacy was based

too. vaguely in "emanations" from the "totality .of the Constiiution, ".the recognition of that right there led to conti_nuing "probing and refinement" to determine from what provisions that right is properly derived and what its dimensions .are.

Although the determination of legal point in-

volved. in dramatic cases such as Stanl_gy, Eisenstadt, and
Wade cannot be ignored, the cumulative influence of Griswold
on judicial opinion-formation "highlight(s] the tendency of
doctrine.
go~d

Where the law is heading is, we may speculate, as

or better a focus for decision for lower judges than

black-letter parsing."lOO
Conclusions
Since Boyd in 1886, the Supreme Court.has made it
clear that individual privacy is an interest that the Consti·tution protects through the Fourth Amendment.

In decisions

sin6e'then, the Court has held that in areas from tradi..

tional police searches to electronic eavesdropping, the right
to privacy is so important that government, on invading it,
mu~t·show

a very "compelling" interest.

Griswold has been the focal point for the development of a constitutional right of privacy in areas other
than· the Fourth Amendment.

That decision established the

constitutional right to privacy in terms much.broader than
the traditional Fourth Amendment terms.

However, it has

been left to decisions since Griswold to more closely define
that
·

~ight

and to delineate its boundaries.

The

bounda~ies

. 100samuel Krislov, The Sunreme Court and Political
... Freedom (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 179.

100

of

Gris~old's

specific privacy of the home, marriage, and

family have been extended through Eisenstadt, Wade, and Cleveland - Cohen to include a woman's right, whether married or
single, to determine, as Griswold also held, whether or not
to beget or to bear children.
The constitutional right to privacy has become visably separable into two branches since Grisw6ld: one, dealing
with the secrecy of one's home and personal possessions, ineluding one's ideas and conduct, founded primarily in the
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the other dealing with
the solitude of certain personal intimacies and the autonomy
~1

personal decision-making, primarily founded in the "liber-

,

ty" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The

scope and implications of neither the first branch, involving
secrecy of the home and possessions, nor the second, involving
personal intimacies, have been fully developed by the Court.
However, ~t appears that the constitutional right to privacy
is focused on protecting an inner core of personal life against
unjustified invasion by laws and rules of society)
It is important also to see Griswold, Eisenstadt,
Wade, and Stanley as part of a "rational continuum" of decisions protecting rights other than those enumerated in the
Bill of Rights.

The right to privacy protected by these de-

cisions is a substantive, due process right.

Altho~gh

pri-

vacy protection after Griswold has been separated into two
distinct areas for

~he

nurnc~es

o~

this

stud~,

i~

should ta

emphasized that the Stanley decision makes the two areas of
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"secrecy" and "solitude"-"autonomy" more easily associable
under the general term "right to privacy."

Where the Stan-

1.§..Y "right to privacy in the home" intersects with the Gris-

wold-Eisenstadt-Wade "right to privacy in sexual intimacies,"
there is an area common to both which suggests that privacy
of sexual intimacies in the privacy of the home rates an especially high degree of protection.

The fact that the

S~an-

ley-Griswold-Eisenstadt-Wade decisions are all developments
of a substantive, due process right unenumerated in the Bill))
of Rights may also be precedent for the development of other
such rights.
Since the focus of the right of privacy's development has been on the relatively short period of the Warren
and Eurger Courts, a comparison should be made of these
Courts' progress in the development of a privacy right.

The

Warren Court had made rapid strides even before Griswold in
developing a theory of privacy through First Amendment guarantees.

In Berger and Katz it recognized that electronic

surveillance had to be carefully supervised by the judiciary,
and not left to determinations of administrative utility or
efficiency by legislatures or law enforcement officers.
Griswold and Stanlev, of course, were the Warren Court's
primary bulwarks for privacy.

Nevertheless, the period of

the Warren Court ended before the effect of Griswold and
Stanle'' was clear.
The Burger Court can be dated from the seating of
the third and fourth I:i:rnn

::.:~:;ointees,

Lewis ? .

and William H. Rehnquist, in January 1972.

Fo'.·12

.l l,

.:·~.

In a short span
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of' time that Court has given a surprisingly broad interpretation in the area of rights associated with the Griswold

~e.cision,

primarily in Eisenstrrdt and \'lade.

However,

in cases following the Stanlev decision,· the Burger Court
strictly limited the protection afforded to obscenity to
the privacy of the home, and in the area of Fourth Amendment privacy rights, the Court has remained rather restrictive.

A recent study of the 3urger Court's record on pri-

vacy as of late-1973 said that the Burger Court
{jl n its attempt to resolve the question concerning a substantive definition of privacy, ..•

has nrovided an odd mixture of activism and selfrestraint. The birth control case is clearly activist ..• Likewise, the abortion decisions
breathe of activism ...• Earlier, in the Wyman v.
James decision, the Court had taken a much more
restraintist position .. ,.101
This apparent inconsistency of privacy protection on the
Burger Court, the study proposes, is "consistent with a
type of policy_making approach ... characterize(ct]as
'active incrementalism. '"

Furthermore, the study asserts

that "with the exception of Douglas, there has been a consistent lack of rationality in the development of a system
. ~-· .

.

of' privacy. "
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· ·There is an area of privacy, however, with which
iieither.the activist Warren Court nor the Burger Court has
.adequately dealt.

This is the very controversial area of

government gathering and use of personal information, including· financial records, arrest records, and other data
· 1011.'filliam R. ':!:'ho::ias, "Shadow of l994: The .Surf:P-r
Court and the En:.ersing .::::.ight of ?ri vac:v?" paper presented at
..

the Southern Political Science Association, Sheraton-3iltmore
Hotel, _·Atlanta, Ga., 1-3 November 1973, p. 27.
·102.
.
Ibid. , p. 28 .
. .'-.

~

,

'

·-

,.

". -
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on millions of Americans. Although the Court has not de;

'

fined the perimeters of privacy surroundi:ng the Stanlev and
Wade decisions, perhaps the most important aspect of privacy which the Court has not protected is this area of
personal information.

Although it belongs most appropri-

ately in the area discussed earlier as "secrecy in the home
and personal possessions, including conduct and ideas," it
is dealt with here, in conclusion to this study because it
portends so much for the future protection of the right to
privacy.

By upholding the constitutionality of the Bank

Secrecy Act in California Ba~kers Assoct~~ion,

10

3the Court

has indicated that government access to personal inforI

mation concerning citizens is necessary to control ever.'

>

increasing crime in America.

However, government accumu-

lation of information into computer dossiers has ranged
further than the records of known criminals.
Either by choice or by legal requirements, most
government agencies are avid data collectors.

For example,

the Civil Service Commission maintains a "security file"
in electrically powered rotary cabinets containing 2,120,000
index cards.

In its "security investigations index" the

commission has 10,250,000 cards covering investigations
since 1939.

Still another file tabbed "investigative" con-

sists of.625,000 folders containing reports of current investigations.
'-

':'

,-~"'

":

.

In addition, 2,100,000 earlier files are

~

held at.the Washington National Records Center.

This is

; .

?~lv

one agency.

:n

si~ilar

fashion,

data

banks are

m~in-

tained by the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Eureau
. .lOJSee above, p.60.
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of Customs, Federal Bureau of Investieations, National Science
Foundation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Passport Office, Social

~ecurity Administration, and many more. 104

To date, the primarv checks against abuse in information-gathering have been bureaucratic self-restraint and exposure by the press.
in this area.

Judicial relief has not been forthcom3.ng

An anti-war activist who sought relief against

.the Army's alleged surveillance of unlawful civilian political
activity brought a class action suit to the Supreme Court in
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 {1972).

He claimed that the Army

spying and accumulation of information on civilians had a
"chilling effect

0

on their freedom of expression.

The Court

did not rule on the alleged invasion of privacy of expression
and held that Tatum's claim was non-justiciable since he had
suffered·no actual harm or "threat of specific future harm."
Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing the Court's
opinion, said that deciding the question brought by Tatum
"would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of executive action."

He

said that role "is appropriate for the Congress acting
through its committees and the 'power of the purse;'

it is

not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately
threatened injury resulting from unlawful govern. '
mental action. 1110 5
The realization in the sixties of the widespread
surve~llan.ce

and information-gathering activities of the FBI

and Army Intelligence uni ts nressed Conf_"ress into

l054o8 u.s. 1, 14-15 {1972).

stud:.'3-r.~
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the problem,

Uncovered by Congress and the press in 1970

was the "CONUS" operation of the Army which monitored and
compiled information on organizations and individuals engaged in activities considered inimical to the national deIndividuals included U.S. Senator Adlai

fense interests.

Steverison III, Representative Abner Mikva, Georgia State
Representative

Julian Bond, newsmen, university profes-

sors, and businessmen.

Committees which held hearings on

government surveillance and

record-keepin~

activities and

published their results and recommendations included the
Senate .Subcommittee on Constitutional

Ri~hts,

the Senate

Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures,
the House Subcommittee on Government Operations; and the
House Special Committee on the Invasion of
Despite the

hearin~s

Priva~y. 106

and studies beginning in 1965,

there is still no legislatively produced protection for the
collection and dissemination of information by government
agencies.

More studies are underway.

Both the Nixon Ad-

ministration and U.S. Senator Sam Erviri (D-N.C.) proposed
bills to safeguard criminal records and intelligence information exchanged by law enforcement agencies. 10 7Also,
four bills aimed at protecting financial records are being
considered by both the
generally

p~opose

~ouse

and the Senate.

The bills

that banks disclose financial records of

their customers only when the customer has consented in

lO~ John

M. 0 'Brien, "!<ee-ping Track of Elected Of±'icials," :.in Ur.-::le Sa~ l;._."'.:~~l.:-2.t'.C_ ·-:: 11, p. 179.
1

•

.

-.

;..
lO?see l•~ark R. Arnold, "Administration Gives Big
Boost to.a Privacy Bill," National Ob§erver 23 :<'ebruar:v
1974, p. 2, :and William L. Shappley, Jr., "Branded: Arrest
Records ·of the Unconvicted," ;,~ississi nni.. Law Journal 44 ·
(November 1973): 928.
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writing, or upon an authorized subpoena or court order.

The Nixon Administration has initiated more studies
of privacy invasion in government procedures.

A year-long

HEW study on the protection of citizens' rights with regard to computer compilations was made public in July 1973,
giving broad recommendations.

However, President Nixon, in

his "Right to Pri vac;.r'' radio address of

Februar~'

23, 1974,

announced that he was establishing a Cabinet-level committee
to do more studying of the privacy problem. 10 9
The Supreme Court's prescriptive powers are limited
when intrusion into personal privacy is caused by patterns
of political and bureaucratic behavior.

Respect for pri-

vacy in the area of personal information will undoubtedly
have to come from congressional oversight of federal agencies, and more importantly, from greater sensitivity of
governmental officials to the threats to privacy.

Perhaps

a new federal agency designed to deal with safeguarding the
government data banks would help.110The role of the Court has
been a vital one in bringing constitutional recognition to
the privacy concern.

The future of that role, however, with

regards to protecting the privacy of personal information
was expressed in 1966 and is just as relevant today:
If Congress and governmental agencies develop a
high degree of sensitivity to these. threats of
dignity and privacy, the need for judicial inter108see Michael K. Guest, "Stark v. Connellv: Defining
the Bank Customer's Right of Privacy," Indigng_Law Journal 48
(Summer 1973):_ 649.
.
109...,
~
·· '.ec,
t · ·°1· .c-'nt:
o_f'
;:,ee :::iusanna
.-.c
;~ixon ....,e s
up ~::i ane 1 on ,,
0
Privacy," Washington Post 2LJ. February 1974, p. 2.
110see Grant ~orris, "The Computer Data Sank-Privacy
Controvers:r Revisited," C2.tholic Uni versi tv Law Review 22
(Spring"l973): 628.
11 •• •

.;:;:

y
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vention will decline, and if government becomes
the model and preceptor of more decent behavior
by those possessin~ power, it follows that private institutions will either voluntarily assume
a more responsible attitude toward those into
whose live~ they intrude, or government, bv law,
will compel greater respect for the privacies
of life.111
111 William M. Beane~r, "The Gr_iswold Case and the
Expanding Rieht to Privacy," Wisconsin law Review 1966
(Fall ~966): 994-95.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX
Amendments to the U.S. ·constitution Relevant to
The Sunreme Court's Develonment of a Right to Privacy
Amendment One: "Congress shall ma'ke no law respecting an
estahlishment of religion, or prohihiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,"
Amendment Three: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
nor in time of war, But in a manner to be prescribed by
law."
Amendment Fours "The rights of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Amendment Five: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infanous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 5n
actual service in time of War or publi.c danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
Amendment Nine: '~he enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed·to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
Amendment Fourteen, Section One: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and.subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
an•r person of life, 11.br::!:'"t'', or "!":'rorert·.r, ..,;_~>:0~Jt due -:c:.ocess of law; nor den~ to ~n·· ~r:r~o~ within it~ juri~dict~on
the equal protection of the laws.
109
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